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1 INTRODUCTION 
“There is one and only one social responsibility of business — to use its resources and engage 
in activities designed to increase its profits so long as it stays within the rules of the game, 
which is to say, engages in open and free competition without deception or fraud.” 
Milton Friedman, 19701 
1.1 MOTIVATION 
Growing up in Zug (Switzerland) – the region with the highest density of multinationals in 
relation to its population worldwide – means being confronted with the advantages and 
disadvantages of these entities’ activities. For many decades, the benefits – at least in the 
perception of the broad public and most politicians – clearly prevailed and the region 
uncritically profited from prosperous companies, thereby emerging to the wealthiest region 
of Europe’s second richest country. 2  However, a growing awareness of human rights 
violations, an increasing sensitivity for environmental and social issues and a fear of possible 
consequences for Switzerland’s reputation as the domicile of numerous multinationals has 
ignited the social and political debates on how to best curtail the negative effects 
multinationals can have.      
Naturally, the political parties – among them the Free Democratic Party (FDP) of which I am a 
former member of the communal executive committee – have taken up the discussions and 
have developed a broad variety of solution proposals.3 
                                                     
1 Milton Friedman ‘The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase Profits’ The New York Times Magazine 13 
September 1970, available at http://www.colorado.edu/studentgroups/libertarians/issues/friedman-soc-resp-
business.html. 
2 With an income per capita of USD 46 474 Switzerland is – based on data from the International Monetary Fund’s 
2013 estimates – Europe’s second richest country after Norway. It is, moreover, in the top 10 of the world richest 
countries. 
3 The “FDP” is a classical liberal centre party that has been the driving force behind the creation of contemporary 
Switzerland.  
Introduction 
- 21 - 
As a corporate lawyer advising companies I am confronted on a professional level with the 
positive and negative impacts of these companies’ business activities. In particular, this has 
been highlighted since I was elected into the Board of Directors of Saroil Resources Ltd, a 
company disposing of licences to exploit oil wells in Russia and therefore being active in the 
precarious commodity industry, currently being in the focus of regulatory considerations.4 
However, fascinated by the aspirational set of ethical principles embodied in the various King 
Reports and Codes, the true source of inspiration for a more thorough examination of the 
situation and the presentation of possible solution approaches has been the Corporate 
Governance course at University of Cape Town held by Richard Forster, Company Secretary of 
Old Mutual. He has passed his enthusiasm and passion for Corporate Governance onto me 
and other students he has taught.  
1.2 PROBLEM DEFINITION 
The disequilibrium between the multinationals’ globalised area of operation and the home 
countries legal sphere of influence combined with a lack of a supranational institution that 
have the power to enact and enforce binding law on an international level is the cause for the 
legal vacuum multinationals are potentially operating in, leading to a so called “accountability 
gap”.5 
1.3 OBJECTIVE TARGET 
This minor dissertation particularily aims at – inspired by and considering the King Report and 
after analysing the situation and examining the various possible approaches – providing a 
contribution to the current social and political debates in Switzerland by issuing five 
recommendations on how to reform and adapt the (legal) framework in order to curtail and 
remediate the negative impacts globally active companies potentially have in terms of social, 
                                                     
4 Saroil Resources AG (Saroil Resources Ltd), an excerpt of the commercial register of the Canton of Zug is 
available at  
http://www.hrazg.ch/webservices/inet/HRG/HRG.asmx/getHRGHTML?chnr=1703038086&amt=170&toBeMod
ified=0&validOnly=0&lang=1&sort=0. Upon my return, I will assume responsibility for the legal issues and 
compliance in general. 
5 For the purpose of this minor dissertation, the term “home country” refers to the country where the parent 
company of a multinational entity is located at, whereas “host country” refers to the country where the 
subsidiary of a parent company is located at.  
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economical and environmental issues (in home and host countries alike) without curtailing the 
positive effects companies inarguably have and without immoderatly jeopardising the 
country’s vital competitivness.  
1.4 STRUCTURE 
After outlining the effects and consequences of globalisation and introducing one of the 
multinationals that is considered to be amongst the winners of globalisation, I will illustrate 
what difficulties may arise and which challenges may have to be faced when trying to hold 
multinationals responsible and accountable for their corporate conduct under the currently 
existing frameworks.  
Upon discussing the difficulties of binding regulatory approaches attempting to remedy these 
deficiencies, the mode of operation and the advantages of sets of voluntary (ethical) principles 
are debated and the development of such guiding principles on a supranational level is 
presented as an eligible, pragmatic and effective alternative.  
A brief depiction of the current public and political debates in Switzerland is followed by the 
author’s contribution to current debates in form of a set of recommendations.  
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2 GLOBALISATION AND THE RISE OF MULTINATIONALS 
“When a company of merchants undertake, at their own risk and expense, to establish a new 
trade with some remote and barbarous nation, it may not be unreasonable to incorporate 
them into a joint-stock company, and to grant them, in case of their success, a monopoly of 
the trade for a certain number of years”   
Adam Smith, 17766 
2.1 GLOBALISATION AND MULTINATIONALS 
Defined as a ‘process by which businesses or other organizations develop international 
influence or start operating on an international scale’7, there is an on-going debate amongst 
the scholars on its historic origins. While some scholars track globalisation as far back as to 
the Hellenistic age (323 BC until 31 BC), others are of the notion that globalisation has to be 
considered as a phenomenon of the modern era. Thomas L. Friedmann for example 
distinguishes three eras of globalisation: 8  Globalisation 1.0 (1492–1800) as the period of 
globalisation of countries, globalisation 2.0 (1800–2000) involving the globalisation of 
companies and globalisation 3.0 (2000–present), as a period of globalisation driven by 
individuals. Of primary interest here will be ‘globalization 2.0’ during which companies 
engaging in international trade have gained tremendous power.  
A generally accepted definition of a “multinational corporation” or “transnational 
corporation” (hereinafter referred to as “multinationals”) does not exist.9 For the further use 
of these terms reference is made to the definition of the United Nations, which defines a 
multinational corporation as ‘an economic entity operating in more than one country or a 
                                                     
6 Adam Smith The Wealth of Nations (1776) 617. 
7 Definition by Oxford Dictionaries, available at http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/globalization.  
8 Thomas L. Friedmann ‘It’s a Flat World, After All’ New York Times Magazine 3 April 2005 at 34. 
9 The terms “multinational corporation / company / entity”, “multinational” and “transnational corporation” are 
considered to be interchangeable.  
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cluster of economic entities operating in two or more countries – whatever their legal form, 
whether in their home country or country of activity, and whether taken individually or 
collectively.’10 An essential feature of a multinational company is thus that their activities 
regularly transcends national boundaries. 
2.2 THE IMPACT OF GLOBALISATION 
‘No longer the elected politicians rule the world. There are captains of industry and money 
managers, media tycoons and software specialists who today hold power. They turn the 
whole world into a marketplace’ 
Silvio Bertolami, 199511 
2.2.1 THE TOP 100 ECONOMIC ENTITIES 
Since the 1970s, the number of multinationals has increased worldwide rapidly. With the 
liberalisation of the world economy – the opening up of national markets and the resulting 
increased trade between the countries around the globe – the number of multinationals also 
significantly increased. Previously companies used to produce goods for their domestic market 
and with the entire production – from the development, the extraction of resources, the 
manufacturing to the marketing and distribution of the products – was largely dealt within the 
same state. In the course of the more recent globalisation (the last decades of globalisation 
2.0) this has changed dramatically. Whereas in some cases at least the development of a 
product still takes place at the parent company, the resource extraction, the manufacturing 
and the distribution of the product is conducted by subsidiaries scattered around the world. 
It is estimated that the number of multinationals has increased between 1969 and 2009 from 
6000 to 82 000. 12  During a similar time period, the number of foreign subsidiaries has 
                                                     
10  Commentary on the Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business 
Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/38/Rev.2 (2003), cipher 20. 
11 Silvio Bertolami ‘The Sorcerers of World Economy’ Die Weltwoche 29 June 1995 at 12. 
12 Source : Laurent Carroué ‘Entreprises: le règne des transnationales’ in L’Atlas des mondialisations (2010), 84. 
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increased from approximately 27 000 (1980) to 820 000.13 Multinationals account for over a 
quarter of the world's gross domestic product and directly or indirectly control approximately 
two-thirds of world trade.14 
For the first time since the establishment of Forbes’ The Global 2000 list, a Chinese company 
is considered to be the biggest company in the world: It is the government controlled Chinese 
Bank ICBC with a market value of USD 237.3 billion.15 The highest ranked (position 32) Swiss 
company is Nestlé with a market value of USD 233.5 billion, whereas, Standard Bank Group as 
the biggest South African company, with a market value of USD 19.9 billion is following on 
rank 231.16 If one focuses on the revenues, Royal Dutch Shell is ranked first with a revenue of 
USD 481.7 billion.17 The highest ranked Swiss company (14) is Glencore Xstrata with a revenue 
of USD 214.4 billion, whereas no South African company is finding its way into the top 500.18 
Despite the global economic crisis of the past few years, 40 multinationals (based on a 
comparison of corporate sales and country GDPs) were among the 100 largest economic 
entities in 2012 (compared to 60 countries),19 as can be seen in addendum 9.1.   
Despite a decrease of 20 per cent compared to the year 2002, this figures still reflect the 
remarkable power multinationals have.20 The representation of multinationals is even more 
impressing if the top 150 economic entities are being taken into account: 87 multinationals 
have found their way into the top 150, correlating to 58 per cent of the total economical 
entities.21 
                                                     
13 Ibid.  
14 Ibid.  
15  Global 2000 Leading Companies ‘The World’s Biggest Public Companies’ available at 
http://www.forbes.com/global2000/list/, accessed on 23 September 2013.  
16 Ibid. 48 Swiss companies and 19 South African companies are among the 2000 biggest companies in the world.  
17Fortune Global 500 available at http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/global500/2013/full_list/, accessed 
on 23 September 2013.  
18 Ibid. 14 Swiss companies are among the 500 companies with the highest revenue worldwide.  
19  Tracey S. Keys, Thomas W. Malnight, Christel K. Stoklund ‘Corporate Clout 2013’ available at 
http://www.globaltrends.com/reports/?doc_id=500539&task=view_details, accessed on 23 September 2013.  
20 In the year 2002, 52 multinational companies were among the top 100 economic entities. For more information 
see Sarah Anderson and John Cavanagh Field Guide to the Global Economy 2 ed (2005), list available at 
www1.union.edu/motahare/Eco354/top_100.pdf, accessed on 23 September 2013.  
21 Ibid.  
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Due to their enormous economic resources multinationals do not only affect the welfare of 
entire sectors of the economy, but also have a great impact on the labour market, science, 
values, consumer behaviour, media, politics and therefore almost every aspect of our lives. 
Hence they form, apart from the nation states, by far the most influential group in the current 
international system. 
2.2.2 THE INCREASE OF POWER OF THE PRIVATE SECTOR 
‘The globalisation of investment capital is causing universal insecurity. It makes a mockery of 
national boundaries and diminishes the power of states to uphold democracy and guarantee 
the wealth and prosperity of their peoples. 
Financial globalisation is a law unto itself and it has established a separate supranational 
state with its own administrative apparatus, its own spheres of influence, its own means of 
action. That is to say the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the World Trade 
Organization (WTO). These four powerful institutions are unanimous in singing the praises of 
"market values", a view faithfully echoed by most of the major organs of the media. 
This artificial world state is a power with no base in society. It is answerable instead to the 
financial markets and the mammoth business undertakings that are its masters. The result is 
that the real states in the real world are becoming societies with no power base. And it is 
getting worse all the time.‘ 
Ignacio Ramonet, former chief editor of Le Monde diplomatique, 199722 
In order to safeguard their interests and pursue their objectives, multinationals maintain 
influential lobbies, whether in politics, in international organizations or international forums 
such as the World Economic Forum in Davos.23 The latter provides a platform to establish 
                                                     
22 Ignacio Ramonet ‘Disarming the Markets’ Le Monde diplomatique December 1997, available at 
http://mondediplo.com/1997/12/leader, accessed on 24 September 2013.   
23 Originally a forum for managers, a much broader spectrum of leaders is now encountering each other. In 2012, 
more than 30 heads of state, 28 religious leaders, 50 executives of NGO's, Hollywood celebrities, but also 800 
board members and managers from leading corporations have announced their appearance. More than 2100 
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contacts and cultivate relationships between influential representatives of the private 
industry, the government, academia and the civil society. Due to the broad representation of 
all groups of players, this “marketplace” has established itself as a significant international 
stage on which not only (political) declarations of intent are to be signed, but moreover 
significant foreign policy meetings are taking place.24 The fact that many heads of States and 
members of Governments as well as many private players are present at these international 
conferences indicates that new foreign policy networks have been formed, reflecting the 
crucial and decisive role of multinationals in todays’ world and enabling the latter to exercise 
decisive influence on politicians (and ultimately society). Discussions will take place in such 
forums between state leaders and influential non-state players of the civil society and the 
private sector, while the role of traditional diplomats is more and more marginalised.25 The 
shaping of foreign policy is nowadays at least partially conducted by players who, unlike the 
diplomatic or political envoys of a state, do not enjoy neither political nor democratic 
legitimacy. Despite the fact that representatives of multinationals are not in control of a 
defined territory and do not have a monopoly on violence it has to be acknowledged, that at 
least some of the nation states have lost in importance due to the dominant role 
multinationals have gained, some of them dictating the political agenda in countries with 
rather weak institutions. And even in (powerful) countries with strong institutions it can be 
observed that the power of multinationals has increased – due to the role they play and the 
functions they fulfil – to an extent where they are considered to be a systemic risk threatening 
the foundations of a society, should they cease to exist.26 
                                                     
participants from 94 countries have found their way to Davos, trying to profit from the possibility for formal and 
informal talks and meetings.  
24 In 1990 for example the WEF has set the framework for informal talks between Chancellor Helmut Kohl and 
Hans Modrow, Prime Minister of the DDR. Furthermore, joint discussions between Mubarak (Egypt), Arafat 
(Palestine) and Netanyahu (Israel) have taken place. The WEF 2014 takes place in January and Iran’s President 
Hassan Rohani is expected to meet with US Foreign Minister John Kerry. This will be the first meeting of officials 
of the two countries since the incidents (Iranian Revolution) in 1979.   
25 Stefan Flückiger ‘Wer macht die Aussenpolitik im Bundeshaus‘ Die Weltwoche 24 April 2003 at 34 ff.  
26 During the financial crisis major financial service providers such as American International Group, Fannie Mae, 
Freddie Mac, Commerzbank and UBS AG, with assets of USD 1705 billion. The world’s largest asset manager had 
to be rescued by the various governments because their impact on the economy was simply too big to let them 
fail. The US government for example has assisted the financial service providers with USD 12.6 billion, the 
equivalent of more than 80 per cent of their GDP in 2007). 
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2.2.3 PUBLIC PERCEPTION, RESPONSIBILITIES AND OPPORTUNITIES 
The importance and significance of multinationals outlined above permeating and dominating 
our lives in various aspects brings tremendous social responsibilities of such companies with 
it. In fact, the discussions regarding the operations conducted by multinationals have been 
very controversial in the past 30 years. Yet in the 1970s the impact of multinationals and their 
business activities have been viewed very critically and have been considered to constitute a 
threat,27 today a critical but more positive assessment is prevailing. This is mainly due to the 
realisation that the global expansion of multinationals may be conducive to the economic and 
social development of both the home and the host country. Additionally, since the 1990s co-
operations between states and international organisations and non-state actors, in particular 
NGOs, have been initiated which have also indirectly contributed to the improved image of 
multinationals.28 However, nowadays, the conduct and behaviour of multinationals is being 
observed and analysed by the media and NGO’s more carefully and thoroughly than ever.  
On the other hand, states can profit of the considerable importance of multinationals by 
cooperating with multinationals domiciled in the country, enabling them to gain more weight 
and bargaining power in the political arena.29 
2.2.4 THE ADMONISHING CONSCIENCE OF CIVIL SOCIETY 
Civil society is, apart from the international community the most important opponent of 
multinationals, as far as the containment and control of their power is concerned.30 NGOs and 
                                                     
27 The relocation of production to low-wage countries and the resulting loss of local jobs particularly created 
tensions. 
28 See chapter 6. 
29 An illustrative example is the official visit to South Africa of Swiss Federal Councillor Johann Schneider-Ammann 
from 4-8 September 2013, meeting South African Minister of Trade and Industry Rob Davies. Since the managing 
partner of our law firm (Umbricht Attorneys at Law, Zurich), Georg C. Umbricht, is the president of the Swiss-
South African Chamber of Commerce (SwissCham Southern Africa, http://www.scsa.ch) and has therefore been 
part of the business delegation accompanying Federal Councillor Schneider-Ammann, I had the chance to join 
the delegation and participate in the official program. The business delegation inter alia consisted of 
representatives of Nestlé S.A., Novartis AG, the Roche Group, Banque Julius Baer & Co Ltd., UBS AG, Bühler AG, 
ABB Ltd and Glencore Xstrata plc has added significant weight to the official Swiss (diplomatic) delegation. As the 
representatives of Economiesuisse, the Swiss Business Federation, after a few glasses of wine and off the records 
admitted: The South African officials are actually primarily interested to meet the members of the business 
delegation, hence the diplomatic delegation is rather accompanying the business delegation than vice versa.       
30 John M. Kline ‘Political activities by transnational corporations: bright lines versus grey boundaries’ in: United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development Transnational Corporations, Vol. 12, Number 1 (2003), at 9.  
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media are acting as the voice of civil society, playing a pivotal role in ensuring that any 
unethical conduct or an abuse of the multinational’s abundant power will be revealed and 
scourged by the public. 31  In particular NGOs are actively engaged demanding social, 
sustainable and human rights-compliant corporate policies, particularly in cases where the 
state, whether due to a lack of legal options, a rigid diplomatic system or due to its economic 
dependence, does not oppose to the multinationals’ misconduct.32 
The public pressure and the media echo multinationals have to face increased enormously in 
recent years. Negative side phenomena of entrepreneurial activities are subject to intense 
public criticism, and multinationals have to carefully balance their financial interests versus 
the broad interests of society in order to avoid any undesired reputation and goodwill 
impairments.  
2.2.5 FORMS OF CORPORATE MISCONDUCT 
If multinationals are being named in connection with human rights violations, regularly their 
involvement is of an indirect nature: ‘The vast majority of serious complaints about 
transnational corporations concern their alleged role in supporting, encouraging and 
benefiting from the egregious human rights abuses committed by joint venture partners, 
suppliers, and other groups with whom they do business.’ The difficulty is that ‘in the majority 
of these cases, it is hard to prove the corporations in question intended to commit the 
abuses(.)’, which points to the problem of the accountability gap.33 
                                                     
31 The increased recognition of NGOs is for example evidenced by its observer and consultative status with 
ECOSOC (UN) and the establishment of an "Open Forum”, parallel to the WEF. The website www.oneworld.org 
provides a good overview of currently important NGO activities. A good example for a very active NGO is the 
Berne Declaration (http://www.evb.ch/en/p9451.html), ‘promoting more equitable, sustainable and democratic 
North-South relations since 1968.’ Their “demand charter” includes (i) a comprehensive product liability, (ii) 
environmental sustainability, (iii) decent working conditions, (iv) appropriate marketing, (v) CSR-conform 
lobbying (no lobbying activities which are in contrast to the CSR policy), (vi) ethical tax policies, (vii) full 
transparency, (viii) standardised controls, (ix) consistent liability and compensation and (x) that CSR has to come 
from the top. 
32 Ulrich Beck ‘Die Subpolitik der Globalisierung: Die neue Macht der multinationalen Unternehmen‘ (1996) 47 
Gewerkschaftliche Monatshefte at 674. Beck explains the potential threat of global businesses: ‘However, global 
corporations hold not only a key role in shaping the economy, but society as a whole - even if it is "only" in that 
they can withdraw the material resources of the company (capital, taxes, jobs).’ As a result, multinationals gain 
enormous power over the affected governments. 
33 Rachel Chambers ‘The Unocal Settlement, Implications for the Developing Law on Corporate Complicity in 
Human Rights Abuses’ at 15 available at www.wcl.american.edu/hrbrief/13/unocal.pdf, accessed on September 
27, 2013.  
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An example of an indirect involvement in human rights violations is the business deal 
considered by the “King of Oil” (Marc Rich) to be his ‘most important and most profitable’ deal 
of his life.34 Despite an oil embargo against South Africa’s apartheid regime enacted by the 
United Nations General Assembly, the Swiss company Marc Rich + Co AG mutated to become 
South Africa’s most important oil supplier from 1979 to 1994 presumably enabling the 
apartheid regime to keep its machinery going, allegedly delivering 400 million barrels oil at 
averagely USD 8 above the spot market price per barrel.35 This has resulted in a profit for Marc 
Rich + Co AG of approximately USD 2 billion.       
Another disturbing example is the one of Trafigura AG.36 In order to save refining costs and 
maximise profits, Trafigura AG (revenues in 2012: USD 120 billion) simply applied a procedure 
called “caustic washing” after buying sulphurous crude oil from the Mexican PEMEX very 
cheaply.37 By doing this on a chartered ship in the open sea, compliance with environmental 
standards was avoided.  
However, the disposal of the waste product of this “offshore refining process”, a penetrating 
smelling sediment full of sulphur and caustic soda, resulted in a colossal problem. Initially, 
Trafigura tried to get rid of the waste by simply declaring it as slops.38 Ports are required to 
provide disposal facilities for slops. However, Trafigura’s tanker Probo Koala (refer to 
addendum 9.2 for image) did not manage to trick the ports of Malta, Augusta (Sicily) and 
Gibraltar. In Amsterdam, Trafigura rejected an offer of APS, a private waste disposal company 
who has analysed the “slops”, to take care of the waste for €1000 per cubic metre.39 Obviously 
this was deemed too much for Trafigura, who (organised through its subsidiary “Puma 
Energy”) instead accepted an offer from a newly found waste management company located 
                                                     
34 Quotation of Marc Rich in Daniel Ammann’s The King of Oil (2009) 194. It must be mentioned though that 
Switzerland was not a UN member and hence Swiss companies were (legally) not obliged to adhere to the 
embargo.  
35 If one goes even further back in history, the comparison with many of the still existing German companies 
during the Nazi regime comes to mind.  
36 Trafigura AG is a Swiss-Dutch multinational trading with commodities, formed by former Marc Rich traders.  
37 Caustic washing is a controversial, in many places for environmental reasons prohibited method by which some 
of the sulphur is bound by adding chemicals. It is however much cheaper than an ordinary treatment in a refinery.  
38 Slops is an oily dirt water occurring by cleaning the tanks with water.   
39  The accumulated waste in the meantime amounted to 250 cubic metres. The disposal would have cost 
Trafigura €250 000.  
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in Abidjan at the Ivory Coast, charging between USD 30 and 35 per cubic metre. However, the 
waste management company simply dumped the waste on a local (and open) landfill, 
ultimately causing various illnesses of approximately 100 000 people and even more tragic, 
the death of 15 people.40 
Apart from the indirect complicity in relation to government human rights violations, 
multinationals are also being criticized for their direct involvement in human rights violations, 
environmental scandals and cases of corruption etc. 
An example of a direct involvement in human rights violations are the activities of Shell in the 
mid-90s in Nigeria. Shell has collaborated with the Nigerian military regime which was 
responsible for the persecution, torture and murder of political opponents. Shell did not only 
not make use of its position of economic strength by not intervening in any kind of form, but 
moreover (allegedly) requested, assisted and financed the brutal actions conducted by the 
Nigerian military regime.41 In terms of environmental scandals, Shell has been accused for 
being responsible for environmental damages caused by oil spills in Nigeria.  
2.2.6 INTERIM CONCLUSION 
The criticism in connection with the business activities of multinationals encompasses a wide 
range of human rights, social and environmental issues. The examples cited above are not 
exhaustive and the problem areas embrace harmful or poor working conditions, minimum 
wages, excessive working hours, child labour or forced labour, discrimination in personnel 
selection, physical abuses, corruption and non-transparent business practices, as well as 
reckless pollution, depletion of natural resources and contributing to an accelerated climate 
change. 
                                                     
40 For further information see the UN Report of the Special Rapporteur on the adverse effects of the movement 
and dumping of toxic and dangerous products and wastes on the enjoyment of human rights, Okechukwu Ibeanu, 
available at www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/.../A-HRC-12-26-Add2.pdf, accessed on 27 September 
2013 and the BBC High Court defence against Trafigura libel suit released by WikiLeaks, available at 
www.timothyhorrigan.com/documents/bbc-trafigura.pdf, accessed on 27 September 2013. 
41 For more information check the website of the Center for Constitutional Rights on http://ccrjustice.org/learn-
more/faqs/factsheet%3A-case-against-shell-0, accessed on 27 September 2013. The lawsuits against Shell in 
front of United States District Court for the Southern District of New York under the 1789 Alien Tort Statute were 
settled for USD 15.5 million.   
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There is no doubt that many of the practices illustrated above are not human rights compliant 
and constitute a violation of ethical values. The ever-increasing pressure in the very 
competitive private sector does not contribute to an adequate consideration of humanitarian 
and environmental issues, and the numerous critical reports about multinationals’ misconduct 
do in fact reflect this. 
The exemplary listing of these problematic and questionable business practices could be easily 
extended by other examples, so that Peter T. Muchlinskys title question ‘Human rights and 
multinationals – is there a problem?’42 decidedly has to be answered with yes, as the graphs 
pertaining to alleged human rights violations illustrate in addendum 9.3.43 However, the scope 
of Muchlinsky’s question has to be broadened to other (environmental and social) issues. 
  
                                                     
42 Peter T. Muchlinsky ‘Human rights and multinationals – is there a problem?‘ in International Affairs nr. 77 
(2001) 31-48 at 31.  
43 Figures in the graphics: Ruggie Report. 
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3 GLENCORE XSTRATA PLC – ‘THE BIGGEST COMPANY 
YOU’VE NEVER HEARD OF’44 
‘I do not know how oil does smell’ 
Marc Rich, King of Oil, 201145 
What, at first sight, seems to be an unspectacular multinational as many others is in truth a 
giant and has been referred to twice in this minor dissertation. Glencore International AG with 
a revenue of USD 186.152 in the year 2012 has taken position 66 in the Corporate Clout 
2013.46  Furthermore, the company has been mentioned in connection with the business 
conducted by Marc Rich with the apartheid regime – albeit then using its original company 
name.47 But for a better (comprehensive) understanding of the company’s background, it is 
essential to briefly have a look at Europe’s chaos and turmoil caused by World War II and the 
migration processes thereby instigated.  
3.1.1 MARCELL REICH AND THE EVE OF “FALL GELB” 
Born in 1934 in Antwerp (Belgium) as the son of a Polish father and a French mother, Marcell 
Reich did not get to spend much time in the most important diamond trade center in the 
world. In order to enable the execution of Fall Gelb,48  the German Nazi-troops captured 
Belgium and the Netherlands in May 1940 in advance. Since Reich was born into a Jewish 
                                                     
44 Onstad, Eric; Macinnis, Laura and Webb, Quentin ‘Special Report: The biggest company you’ve never heard of’ 
Reuters available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/02/25/us-glencore-idUSTRE71O1DC20110225, 
accessed on 18 November 2013. 
45  Daniel Ammann ‘Ich weiss nicht, wie Erdöl riecht‘ Die Weltwoche 27 January 2011 available at 
http://www.weltwoche.ch/index.php?id=540961, accessed on 13 November 2013. 
46 See page - 95 - ff.  
47 See page - 30 -. 
48 The “Fall Gelb“ is the code name for a very successful operation of the German troops in World War II, taking 
the French Forces completely by surprise. The strategically brilliant plan which is the root of the French defeat is 
considered to have revolutionised military affairs in the mid-twentieth century and has been developed by 
Generalleutnant Erich von Manstein, however inspired by Generalleutnant Heinz Guderian.  
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family, this meant that the Reich’s had to give up everything and flee to France as fast as they 
could. However, since the successful execution of Fall Gelb has led to a French defeat, the 
journey of the Reich’s did not come to an end yet. Planning on emigrating to Australia, they 
ended up in the United States of America, where Marcell Reich changed his name to Marc 
Rich, and the surname soon turned out to speak for itself.  
After giving up his marketing studies, Marc Rich started to work for Philipp Brothers in New 
York in 1954. Founded in 1901 by two German Jewish brothers, it used to be the world’s 
largest commodities trading company.49 After an intermezzo as office manager for Philipp 
Brothers in Madrid and a dispute regarding his remuneration, Rich ended up incorporating his 
own company, the Marc Rich + Co AG, with a few other (former) traders of Philipp Brothers 
on 3 April 1974 in Zug, and therefore in the same city as the European headquarters of the 
latter has been located since 1956.50 But why did they both choose a little city with 20 000 
citizens in the center of Switzerland?  
3.1.2 THE EMERGENCE OF ZUG AND SWITZERLAND TO THE WORLD’S LARGEST 
COMMODITIES HUB 
Formerly being a rural area living from livestock breeding and the dairy industry, Zug emerged 
to the wealthiest Canton of Switzerland through attracting national and international 
companies by enacting tax privileges for certain companies in 1924.51 Despite plans of Nazi 
Germany to invade Switzerland, the neutral country had, moreover, not been devastated 
during World War II and therefore had an intact infrastructure.52 Additionally (and after World 
                                                     
49 For more information see Helmut Waszkis’ The History of a trading Giant. 
50 Daniel Ammann The King of Oil (2009) 48 and 76. 
51 The „Holdingprivileg“ grants a privileged taxation to holding companies. No tax is being levied on profits on a 
Cantonal level, but a rate of 0.002 per cent is being levied on the companies’ share capital. Additionally, a tax 
rate of 8.5 percent applies at a national (federal) level. The “Domizilprivileg” applies to companies that do not 
conduct any business in Switzerland. Whereas no tax is levied on a Cantonal level on revenues from abroad, once 
again a capital tax of 0.0075 per cent applies. Furthermore, the federal profit tax of 8.5 per cent is being levied. 
Companies that mainly carry out business abroad but also conduct domestic business activities are referred to 
as “mixed companies”. If qualified as a such, the non-domestic revenues are taxed at between 5–25 per cent on 
a Cantonal level whereas the domestic profits are taxed at a standard rate. Additionally, a cantonal capital tax of 
0.001 per cent is levied. On a federal (national) level, a tax rate of 8.5 per cent on all the revenues applies.     
52 Operation Tannenbaum (fir tree) refers to an invasion plan devised by the Wehrmacht (the German armed 
forces) in 1940. Hitler was disgusted by the political system (direct, decentralised democracy) and the values 
Switzerland stood for and denominated Switzerland to be the mortal enemy of the new Germany.  
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War II quite remarkably), the Swiss Franc (CHF) was always freely convertible and neither the 
import nor the export of capital has been restricted or controlled in any way. Furthermore, 
Zug offered – with Zurich being only twenty minutes away – access to an international airport 
and more importantly to one of the world’s most important and sophisticated financial 
centres.  
At least some of the factors mentioned above have also attracted Philipp Brothers in 1956 to 
set up their European headquarter there. Upon Rich’s departure from Philipp Brothers, his 
company, Marc Rich + Co AG, starting in 1974 with a share capital of CHF 2 million 
(approximately ZAR 22 million) in a four-room apartment in Zug’s neighbourhood where all 
the Italian immigrants used to live, quickly became a global player concluding lucrative deals 
amongst others with despots and dictators such as the Shah of Persia and after the revolution 
in 1979 his antipode Ayatollah Khomeini, Chilean Dictator Augusto Pinochet, Cuba’s  “el 
massimo lider” Fidel Castro, the Sandinista government in Nicaragua and the South African 
apartheid regime presided by B.J. Vorster and later P.W. Botha. In a business relying on trust 
and loyalty the departure of personalities such as Marc Rich, Pincus Green, Alexander Hackel, 
John Trafford and Jacque Hachuel from Philipp Brothers proved to be fatal for the latter – and 
a blessing for the pariahs themselves.  
Whereas Marc Rich + Co AG prospered during the 1970s and 1980s and profited from the 
collapse of the oligopoly of the “seven sisters”,53 the 1990s heralded the decline of the King 
of Oil, as he was called in the meantime. Not only did Marc Rich have to bear the death of his 
daughter and the divorce from his wife, but moreover Marc Rich + Co AG conducted the worst 
deal ever by attempting to manipulate the global zinc market, causing the company a loss of 
USD 172 million. Besides this, the criminal charges instigated inter alia by Rudolph W. Guliani, 
                                                     
53 During the 1970s (and inter alia instigated by Libya’s young colonel Muammar al-Gaddafi), many oil-blessed 
(OPEC) countries nationalised their oilfields, thereby cancelling the for the “seven sisters” (Jersey (Exxon), 
Socony-Vacuum (Mobil), Standard of California (Chevron), Texaco, Gulf, Royal Dutch Shell and British Petroleum) 
profitable concession system of the past few decades and thereby ending their factual domination of the oil 
market. Oil traders such as Marc Rich tremendously gained in importance ensuring the oil producing countries 
through their network the sale of the oil. The oil producing countries and the traders instead of the oil 
multinationals were now the decisive players in the oil business. During these decades, the oil market has 
become very volatile due to the numerous oil crisis inter alia caused by the conflicts between Israel and its 
neighbours. In the meantime, the demand for oil has increased steadily. By succeeding to conclude a long-term 
oil-procurement contract, traders took advantage of the volatile oil market, storing the oil and selling it at much 
higher spot prices. Marc Rich is attributed to be the inventor of the spot market.       
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who became later Mayor of New York, in the US in 1983 against Marc Rich, Pincus Green and 
Marc Rich International (a subsidiary of Marc Rich + Co AG) did not prove to be conducive for 
the companies’ reputation and business.54 
Negative headlines and spotlight are poisonous in a secretive business based on confidence 
and trust. On 29 November 1993, the managers of Marc Rich + Co. AG committed “patricide” 
on Marc Rich “forcing” him to sign a management buyout contract. Marc Rich sold his 
company shares in 1994 for USD 600 million.55 Marc Rich therefore suffered a similar fate as 
Philipp Brothers did nearly 20 years before.  
The new owners of Marc Rich & Co. AG renamed the company in 1994 into Glencore (Global 
Energy Commodities and Resources) International AG (hereinafter “Glencore”) and the 
multinational has – in terms of revenues – evolved to the 12th biggest company in the world 
over the years, with a revenue of USD 214 billion in 2012.56 In the aftermath of this change of 
ownership, Glencore has desperately tried to negate its origin. In its prospectus published in 
connection with the issue of new shares in order to enable the merger with Xstrata (see 
subchapter 3.1.3.2, hereinafter referred to as “merger prospectus”), neither the famous but 
disgraced founder nor the former name of the company have been mentioned a single time.57 
The New Statesman has ironically called Rich to be ‘Glencore’s worst kept secret (…)’.58 
However, a few of the “Rich boys” have chosen to start their own business. Trafigura, the 
world’s third biggest raw material seller does not only do dubious offshore refining, but also 
                                                     
54 The Washington Post has titled Rich as the “refugee of the century”. The charge sheet involved inter alia tax 
evasion, organised crime and trading with the enemy. In June 1983, Marc Rich left New York with his family and 
moved to Switzerland, never ever setting a foot on American soil again. The US has started numerous attempts 
to get hold of Rich and has not even refrained from sending federal agents to Zug with the order to kidnap Rich. 
However, this illegal action was prevented by Swiss Police. In January 2001 and upon lobbying activities by Ehud 
Barak, Shimon Peres and other influential persons, both Marc Rich and Pincus Green were pardoned by Bill 
Clinton on his last day of office.  
55 The company was active in 128 countries and had an alleged value of USD 1 to 1.5 billion. 
56 Fortune Global 500 2013 available at http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/global500/2013/full_ 
list/?iid=G500_sp_full, accessed on 30 September 2013. 
57 Glencore has successfully avoided to mention its origin and connection to Marc Rich by ignoring the fact that 
it has been incorporated in 1974 under the name Marc Rich + Co AG and by avoiding to use the name of Marc 
Rich by simply referring to “the founder”. For more information see page 57 of the merger prospectus.  
58  Oliver Williams ‘Marc Rich, Glencore’s fugitive founder’ New Statesman 10 October 2012, available at 
http://oncogenesis.rssing.com/browser.php?indx=1309563&item=2935, accessed on 14 November 2013.   
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makes respectable profits. Having its headquarters in Lucerne, the companies’ annual 
revenues amounted to USD 120 billion in 2012.59 
Founded as an infrastructure and electrics company meant to be active in South America, 
Südelektra was incorporated in 1926 and renamed in 1999 into Xstrata AG, after the majority 
of its shares have been acquired by Marc Rich + Co. AG in 1990.60 Xstrata turned into a mining 
giant through a rather aggressive acquisition-strategy in the past few years, operating in over 
20 countries and employing 70 000 people, with a revenue of USD 31.168 billion in 2012.61 
Xstrata is very active in South Africa, as can be seen in the graph in addendum 9.4.62 
However, this is not the only reference to South Africa. Xstrata’s (former) almighty CEO and 
Chairman, Michael Davies, is a South African citizen, born in Port Elizabeth. After graduating 
in Accounting at Rhodes University, he was working as Finance Director at Eskom where he 
got in contact with Südelektra.  
The presence of commodity giants such as the above-mentioned multinationals in 
combination with a highly sophisticated financial market in Zurich and Geneva along with the 
fact that Switzerland has constantly been ranked among the top three nations in terms of life 
quality and is considered to be the most competitive and innovative country in the world63 
has attracted other commodity traders such as primarily oil-trading Vitol SA (revenue 2012: 
                                                     
59 Trafigura does not publish its profits. Information available at http://www.reuters.com/article 
/2013/01/11/trafigura-revenues-idUSL5E9CB9MH20130111, accessed on 30 September 2013.   
60 Excerpt of the Commercial Register of the Canton of Zug available at 
http://www.hrazg.ch/webservices/inet/HRG/HRG.asmx/getHRGHTML?chnr=1703001204&amt=170&toBeMod
ified=0&validOnly=0&lang=1&sort=0, accessed on 30 September 2013.  
61 Annual report of Xstrata at 66 available at http://www.glencorexstrata.com/investors/reports-and-
results/xstrata/2012/annual-report-2012, accessed on 30 September 2013.  
62 Source: http://www.glencorexstrata.com/assets/Uploads/x-factsheet-xstrata-in-south-africa.en.pdf, accessed 
on 30 September 2013.  
63 For more information see the World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Report 2013 available at 
http://www.weforum.org/issues/global-competitiveness, accessed on 30 September 2013.  
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303 billion!)64, Gunvor SA65 (revenue 2012: USD 93.1 billion)66 or MERCURIA ENERGY TRADING 
SA, founded in 2004 by two former Phibro (as Philipp Brothers has been renamed meanwhile) 
executives. The company also mainly trades crude oil, but has specialised itself on trade with 
the insatiable Chinese market. With a revenue of USD 98 billion in 2012, the company is 
considered to be among the top five of the world’s largest commodity traders.67 
Over the past ten to fifteen years – during the so called commodity super cycle – this little and 
completely landlocked alpine nation without any own resources has emerged to the world’s 
most important centre for the trade of commodities, with estimated 500 companies and, 
(considering the revenues “only”) 10 000 employees. A commodity cluster has developed 
comprising – besides trading – shipping, insuring, transaction financing, providing inspection 
services and product testing, being responsible for 3.5 per cent of Switzerland’s GDP of USD 
632.32 billion in the year 2012.68 
The graph in addendum 9.5 illustrates and reflects Switzerland’s preeminent, almost 
hegemonic position in the world’s energy, minerals and agricultural commodities trading 
market.69  
However, Switzerland’s position is not undisputed. In particular Singapore is known to actively 
campaign on its own behalf, along with Hong-Kong and Dubai who are also lurking and trying 
                                                     
64 Vitol 2012 report available at http://www.vitol.com/latest-news/222-vitol-2012-report, accessed on 1 October 
2013.  
65 Gunvor SA also mainly trades with oil and has – upon the dismantling of Mikhail Khodorkovsky’s Yukos – 
succeeded in becoming the largest trader of Russian oil. According to rumours, Vladimir Putin allegedly holds 
shares of Gunvor himself. For more information see ‘Oil trading group Gunvor denies Putin links’ Financial Times 
3 December 2010 available at http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/e2a8af96-fe3f-11df-abac-
00144feab49a.html#axzz2gSeJW6Eo,accessed on 1 October 2010.  
66  ‘Oil trader Gunvor's 2012 revenues topped $90 bln document’ Reuters available at 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/05/14/gunvor-profits-idUSL6N0DV3AP20130514, accessed on 1 October 
2013. 
67  For more information see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mercuria_Energy_Group and 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/06/11/mercuria-earnings-idUSL5N0EH3EZ20130611.  
68  Report of the interdepartemental plattform on commodities to the Federal Council Background Report: 
Commodities at 1 available at http://www.eda.admin.ch/eda/en/home/recent/dossie/rohsto.html, accessed on 
1 October 2013.   
69 Source: Ibid at 11. 
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to attract the trading giants. The regulatory pressure in the various locations might just turn 
out to be of decisive nature.70 
3.1.3 GLENCORE’S FLOTATION AND THE MERGER WITH XSTRATA 
3.1.3.1 EUROPE’S BIGGEST PRIVATE COMPANY GOES PUBLIC 
‘We will get firepower and we can buy assets when opportunities present themselves in areas 
and sizes that we could not do before’ 
Ivan Glasenberg, CEO of Glencore, 201171 
As indicated before, Glencore’s past business practices have been of a rather opaque and 
sometimes even mysterious nature, thereby providing a fertile soil and ample room for 
rumours and speculations. It’s discreet and non-transparent way of conducting business 
combined with a poor communication strategy has been heavily criticised (inter alia by 
NGO’s), ultimately leading to “honouring” Glencore with the Public Eye Award in 2008 for its 
treatment of water resources and its work forces, both with regard to its Colombian coal 
mines.72 
However, the veil of discretion and non-transparency covering the business practices has 
(arguably) at least partially been lifted with Glencore’s initial dual public offering (IPO) in May 
2011 at the London Stock Exchange and the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, with offerings of 
USD 11 billion being the largest IPO in the entire history of the London Stock Exchange (notably 
founded in 1801). In compliance with the IPO regulations, Glencore issued a 1637 pages strong 
                                                     




accessed on 1 October 2013.  
71 Javier Blas ‘Glencore says listing will boost firepower’ available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/d3f20718-639d-
11e0-bd7f-00144feab49a.html#axzz2kc2Ru27a, accessed on 14 November 2013.  
72 The Public Eye Award is annually awarded by the Public Eye to companies with a poor performance in corporate 
social responsibility (CSR) issues. Conceptually, the Public Eye is a counter-event to the World Economic Forum. 
Unsurprisingly, the commodity sector is above-averagely represented as a the Public Eye’s “hall of shame” 
reveals. For more information see http://www.publiceye.ch. 
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prospectus, thereby (according to Wikipedia) revealing ‘invaluable information about this 
private company that has remained discreet for thirty-seven years.’73 
Considering the (according to some analysts under-priced) offer price of 530 pence per share, 
Glencore’s market value has been appraised at GBP 36.7 billion (or USD 60 billion and 
therefore a fifty fold increase in value to when Rich sold his 51 per cent stake for 
USD 600 million), turning the former “Rich boys” holding fair amounts of shares into very 
wealthy persons.74 According to the NGO Berne Declaration, ‘the six top managers of Glencore 
earned more from the stock market flotation in 2011 than the GDP of each of the 96 poorest 
countries in the world.’75 With a post-IPO stake of 15.8%, the IPO has propelled Glencore’s 
South African CEO Ivan Glasenberg into position 125 of Forbes’ The World’s Billionaries in 2012 
with a net worth of USD 7.3 billion.76 
Unsurprisingly, Marc Rich stated in an interview made by Daniel Ammann and published in 
the Swiss weekly newspaper Die Weltwoche on the occasion of the ten years anniversary of 
Bill Clinton’s pardon, that he would have rather kept the company private had he still been in 
charge. He argued that ‘It's much more practical not to be a listed company. Then you don’t 
have to provide any information. As I said, discretion is a key success factor in this business. 
We preferred to be secretive and tight-lipped. This was a business advantage. Our business 
                                                     
73 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Glencore_Xstrata#Glencore.27s_Initial_Public_Offering_.28IPO.29, accessed on 
13 November 2013. However, the effect on transparency is in as far limited as listed companies do not have to 
reveal information pertaining to transactions amongst the subsidiaries since only consolidated figures have to be 
published.  
74 The same is also true however for the Swiss municipalities in which the “Rich boys” live, such as Ruschlikon the 
lake of Zurich in the case of Ivan Glasenberg. The IPO has brought additional USD 392 million into the public 
coffers of the municipality with 5 000 inhabitants – just through the taxes levied on the income the IPO has 
created. The municipal assembly of Ruschlikon has decided to use the tax revenues to further reduce the already 
low tax rate by 7 per cent. However, the tax blessings have not been welcomed by all citizens and have caused 
intensive discussions in the municipal assemblies. Some citizens clearly stated that they do not want any “dirty 
money” from a commodity giant. In the neighbour-town of Ruschlikon, in Hedingen (and in other municipalities 
such as Affoltern am Albis, Hausen am Albis, Ofelden, Kappel am Albis and Mettmenstetten as well), its citizens 
decided to donate 10 per cent (USD 110 000) of the tax revenue of USD 1.1 million to relief organisations. The 
background is that Glencore is inter alia being criticized for paying low taxes in the countries it exploits its 
commodities by transactions amongst its subsidiaries that are not considered to be at arm’s length (transfer 
pricing). For more information see 3.1.5.1.      
75 Berne Declaration ‘Commodities’ available at http://www.evb.ch/en/p21306.html, accessed on 5 December 
2013.  
76 Forbes ‘The World’s Billionaires‘ available at http://www.forbes.com/profile/ivan-glasenberg, accessed on 13 
November 2013.  
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partners appreciated it as well.’77 Nevertheless, seventeen years after having sold his stake to 
the management, Rich announced to buy shares of the company again at the occasion of the 
IPO.  
This might be due to the fact that in the eyes of Rich, ‘Glencore is a very well managed 
company. It is the best company of the industry.’78 And its CEO, Ivan Glasenberg, is seen by 
Rich to be a brilliant man. Glasenberg grew up in the Johannesburg suburb of Illovo as the son 
of a Jewish luggage manufacturer and importer from Lithuania, whereas his mother is South 
African. Before obtaining a MBA from the University of Southern California in 1983, he studied 
at the University of Witwatersrand where he obtained a Bachelor of Commerce and 
Accountancy. Glasenberg was hired by Rich in 1984 in the US and became a coal trader at the 
age of 27 in South Africa. In 2002, Glasenberg became CEO of Glencore and in 2011 he 
obtained the Swiss citizenship. 
The reasons for the management of “the best company of the industry” to jettison the 
secretive, discreet and non-transparent business model are manifold. One of the main 
reasons, however, seems to be the clearance of debts. A comparison to its competitors reveals 
that the pre-IPO Glencore has had high debts and a rather poor BBB-credit rating. A further 
downgrading of the credit rating has been seen as a sword of Damocles hanging over the 
company, disallowing at least some of the institutional investors to hold Glencore bonds. 
Moreover, the financial crisis and the collapse of Lehman Brothers has dried out the loan 
market and severely impacted the short-term securities market.  
Besides the above-mentioned difficulties in terms of corporate financing, the prospectus 
revealed another reason for the IPO: To fill up the war chest for takeovers and acquisitions. 
Irrespective of the acquisition of further mines or the increase of stakes in mines, rumours 
about a planned dream merger par excellence have always circulated in the financial press.   
  
                                                     
77 Daniel Ammann op cit note45. 
78 Ibid. 
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3.1.3.2 THE MERGER OF THE ‘SIAMESE TWINS’ 
With a sumptuously filled “war chest”, Glencore did not hesitate long to make a dream come 
true. In February 2012 the intention to merge has been announced. The two companies 
domiciled in Zug have been intertwined for a long time. In order to get access to the Swiss 
capital market, Marc Rich + Co AG purchased a 53 per cent stake in Südelektra (as Xstrata was 
formerly named) from a private bank and subsequently used it as a finance vehicle by selling 
some of its shares. As a result, Glencore’s stake in Südelektra who was renamed to Xstrata in 
1999, dropped to 33.65 per cent in 2012.79 
In the aftermath of a failed IPO of some of Glencore’s coal mines in Australia in 2001, Xstrata 
acquired the coal mines from Glencore together with coal mines in South Africa. By then, Mick 
Davies had already been appointed as CEO of Xstrata. According to the financial press, the 
election of Davis as CEO was orchestrated by Glencore.80 
In order to enable Xstrata to acquire the mines from Glencore, Xstrata made an initial public 
offering at the London Stock Exchange in 2002. Moreover, Xstrata AG (the former Südelektra) 
merged into Xstrata plc, a company incorporated in London for the purpose of the listing at 
the London Stock Exchange. However, the headquarters remained in Zug.  
Moreover, Willy R. Strothotte, Glencore’s strong man after the departure of Marc Rich, acted 
as President of the board of Xstrata since 1995.81 At a later stage, Ivan Glasenberg joined 
Xstrata’s board. Furthermore, the two multinationals have concluded exclusive purchase 
contracts for their commodities and have collaborated in terms of marketing.   
The board of Glencore reasoned the need for the merger inter alia as follows:  
‘The Glencore Board believes that the Merger has compelling logic for both Glencore and Xstrata and 
that it is the logical next step for two highly complementary businesses. The Glencore Board believes 
                                                     
79 For more information see page 77 of the merger prospectus.  
80 See for example Peter Koenig ‘Secretive Swiss trader links City to Iraq oil scam’ The Sunday Times 25 September 
2005 available at http://www.thesundaytimes.co.uk/sto/business/article149517.ece, accessed on 14 November 
2013.  
81  Excerpt of the commercial register of the Canton of Zug available at  
http://www.hrazg.ch/webservices/inet/HRG/HRG.asmx/getHRGHTML?chnr=1703001204&amt=170&toBeMod
ified=0&validOnly=0&lang=1&sort=0, accessed on 14 November 2013. 
Glencore Xstrata plc – ‘The Biggest Company You’ve never Heard of’ 
- 43 - 
that putting together the operational excellence of Xstrata and its leading portfolio of industrial mining 
and metals assets with the marketing skills and the developing asset base of Glencore will enable the 
Combined Group to take advantage of changing trends in the way that natural resources are consumed 
and supplied globally, especially as a result of demand in emerging economies. 
The Merger will bring together two highly complementary businesses with a long-standing 
relationship. Both companies have proven track records of growth and value creation for shareholders: 
• Glencore has grown from an equity value of approximately USD 1.2 billion at its management buy-
out in 1994 to a market value (including the Glencore Group’s holding in Xstrata) of approximately 
USD 50 billion as at 6 February 2012; and 
• Xstrata has delivered total shareholder returns of over 370 per cent. (3) since the IPO in March 2002 
and has grown from an equity value of approximately USD 500 million at creation in 2001 to a market 
value of approximately USD 59 billion as at 6 February 2012. The Combined Group will benefit from 
enhanced scale and diversity. It will be the fourth largest global diversified natural resources company 
and will be a major producer and marketer of 18 commodities. Specifically, the Combined Group will 
be:  
• a global leader in export thermal coal, ferrochrome and integrated zinc production; 
• the third largest producer of copper, aiming to grow into the largest independent producer within 
four years; and 
• the fourth largest producer of nickel. 
The Combined Group will have operations and projects in 33 countries with over 150 mining and 
metallurgical facilities, offshore oil production facilities, farms and agricultural facilities and offices in 
40 countries with approximately 130,000 employees. Its presence at each stage of the commodities 
chain will provide it with superior market insight and access to opportunities. These factors, along with 
its established footprint in emerging regions for natural resources investment, including the African 
copper-belt, Kazakhstan and South America, as both an operator and a provider of marketing and 
logistics services to new producers, will provide the Combined Group with substantial new optionality 
and greater strategic flexibility.’82 
The impressive figures mentioned above indicate the enormous measure of this merger, 
occasionally cited as “the mother of mergers”. Financial Times had to go as far back as to 1907 
when Royal Dutch and Shell merged to find an amalgamation of comparable dimensions.  
                                                     
82 Merger prospectus, 42 f. 
Glencore Xstrata plc – ‘The Biggest Company You’ve never Heard of’ 
- 44 - 
In preparation of Glencore’s IPO in 2011 at the London Stock Exchange, 
Glencore International plc with its registered office in St. Helier / Jersey had been 
incorporated as ultimate parent company of Glencore International AG and its fourteen 
subsidiaries in Switzerland. Therefore, and since Xstrata plc had its registered office in London, 
the merger was governed by the laws of the United Kingdom. The merger was implemented 
by a scheme of arrangement under Part 26 of the UK Companies Act (enabling Glencore to 
acquire all of Xstrata’s shares) and had to be sanctioned by the court. The initial offer of 
Glencore allotted for each of Xstrata’s scheme share 2.8 Glencore shares, thereby valuing each 
of Xstrata’s shares at 991.5 Pence and the entire share capital at GBP 30.1 billion 
(USD 47 billion). In order to provide Xstrata’s shareholder with the required amount of 
Glencore shares, Glencore intended to issue additional 5 660 317 060 shares pursuant to the 
merger.83 
The merger should have been approved by Glencore’s shareholder in my hometown (Zug, 
Switzerland) on 11 July 2012. At 11 am on that day however, Simon Murray, Glencore’s 
chairman, appeared in front of the gathered shareholders and hurriedly cancelled the general 
meeting, thereby referring to unexpected “overnight developments”. Subsequently, Xstrata 
cancelled its shareholder meeting to be held on the following day as well.  
Later, mainly due to opposition from Qatar’s sovereign wealth fund, Glencore had to improve 
its offer by increasing the Glencore shares offered to Xstrata’s shareholders to 3.05 for each 
Xstrata share. Moreover, Glencore announced that it is deliberating about changing its offer 
from a scheme of arrangement requiring the acceptance of 75 per cent of Xstrata’s 
shareholder to a takeover, requiring a lower threshold of (more than) 50 per cent. What 
initially has been announced to be a merger of equals almost became a bitter overtone of a 
hostile takeover.   
After breakthrough talks brokered by former Prime Minister Tony Blair, the general meetings 
approved the adjusted offer (Xstrata: 80 per cent, with Glencore not being able to vote its 
33.65 per cent stake; Glencore: 99.43 per cent) in November 2012. Upon all the approvals 
required by the competition authorities in the various affected countries, a long mutual 
                                                     
83 Ibid at 29.  
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history culminated in the merger which was completed on 2 May 2013 and therefore 450 days 
after the intention of merger was announced. As intended, the merger was implemented by 
a scheme of arrangement, leading to an admission 6 163 949 435 new Glencore shares at the 
London Stock Exchange.  
The merger has created a USD 65 – 80 billion colossus and has propelled Glencore Xstrata plc 
(hereinafter “Glencore Xstrata”) into position four of the largest mining companies in the 
world and enabled Glencore Xstrata to become the world’s largest diversified commodities 
trader. Glasenberg expects the synergies to amount to USD 2 billion.  
However, analysts speculate that this takeover is just the beginning and that Anglo American 
is likely to be the next acquisition target.  
In the context of the first offer, Glencore proposed in its prospectus that Mick Davies should 
run the merged company as CEO, with Ivan Glasenberg being the Deputy CEO and President. 
In its revised offer however, Glencore abstained from earmarking Davies as CEO and proposed 
that Glasenberg should become CEO of the combined group board.84 This is said to have 
severely damaged the long friendship between the two South African executives, who both 
grew up in the same Jewish neighbourhood. After a decade Davies left Xstrata. It remains to 
be seen if Davies with his strong operating record adheres to the industry’s tradition by setting 
up an own investment venture and causing a brain drainage at Glencore Xstrata by 
encouraging former colleagues to join him in.  
  
                                                     
84 Ibid at 46.  
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3.1.4 THE FUTURE LIES IN AFRICA – GLENCORE XSTRATA’S LISTING ON JSE 
‘Africa is an important and growing market for the Group and South Africa  
has a strong institutional investor base.’ 
Glencore Xstrata, 201385 
On 10 September 2013, Glencore Xstrata announced its intention to list on the Johannesburg 
Stock Exchange (JSE) by the end of the year.  On 31 October 2013, Glencore Xstrata announced 
that JSE has approved its application for a secondary listing which is set to take place on 13 
November 2013. On 13 November 2013 Glencore opened trading the 34.8 million shares 
being worth more than ZAR 1.9 billion at the JSE at ZAR 55 per share.  
Glencore Xstrata was warmly welcomed in South Africa, inter alia by JSE’s CEO Nicky Newton-
King: ‘We welcome Glencore Xstrata to the JSE's main board. It’s a huge accolade for the 
exchange that a multinational company of Glencore Xstrata's size and stature would select the 
JSE for its secondary listing. We are confident that this listing will enhance Glencore Xstrata’s 
growth prospects and profile on the continent. The listing reflects well on South African 
financial markets and sends a positive message to potential issuers both local and 
international.’86 
Generally, the listing at JSE is seen as a vote of confidence for South Africa and a powerful 
signal. Mike Teke, deputy president of the Chamber of Mines in South Africa considers the 
listing to be a ‘stamp of approval’ for South Africa.87 Former JSE chief marketing officer and 
now Sasfin Capital corporate finance head Noah Greenhill pointed out that ‘This [new listing] 
                                                     
85  Statement in Glencore Xstrata’s announcement of 10 September 2013 available at 
http://www.glencorexstrata.com/media-centre/news/glencorexstrata/2013/investor-day-2013, accessed on 16 
November 2013.   
86  ‘Glencore Xstrata lists on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange’ available at http://www.jse.co.za/About-
Us/Media/Press-Releases/Full-Story/13-11-
14/Glencore_Xstrata_lists_on_the_Johannesburg_Stock_Exchange.aspx, accessed on 16 November 2013.  
87  David McKay ‘What does Glencore bring to the JSE’ available at 
http://www.miningmx.com/page/news/markets/1634792-What-does-Glencore-bring-to-the-
JSE#.UukD9_n8JD8, accessed on 16 November 2013.  
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is a huge development for the JSE and it is highly beneficial for South Africa as a whole’.88 
Zeona Jacobs, director for issuer and investor relations at the JSE, admitted to be excited: ‘It 
does mean a lot. A company of this size and magnitude means a lot in terms of trading. We’re 
very excited.’89 
The listing of Glencore Xstrata is said to be the biggest listing since British American Tobacco 
(BAT) in 2008. Moreover, Glencore Xstrata is now the third biggest company on JSE, after 
SABMiller and BAT.    
But why should Glencore Xstrata want to comply with JSE’s rather onerous (requiring 
compliance with the King Report III) listing requirements? As Glasenberg explained, South 
African investors clamoured for a possibility to invest directly in Glencore Xstrata without 
being confined by foreign ownership limits. Furthermore, Glasenberg stated that the listing 
‘on the JSE is a significant step for Glencore. It not only deepens our relationship with South 
Africa, it highlights our confidence in Africa as a place to invest. We welcome our new 
stakeholders and look forward to building long-term mutually beneficial relationships with 
them.’90 
Some analysts speculate if Glencore Xstrata’s managers are just entering up a new market to 
sell their shares over the next few years. The senior management holds approximately 
25 per cent of the shares, and the companies listed at JSE besides Glencore Xstrata are not as 
diversified. It is therefore expected that Glencore Xstrata’s shares will be met with lively 
interest from institutional shareholders in South Africa. Another view is that Glencore Xstrata 
is paving the way for a takeover of Anglo American. Doing so, while being listed on JSE, might 
antagonise a perception that Anglo American is being “exported”.  
                                                     
88 Brendan Ryan ‘Glencore Xstrata set to burst onto JSE’ available at 
 http://www.bdlive.co.za/business/mining/2013/09/11/glencore-xstrata-set-to-burst-onto-jse, accessed on 16 
November 2013.  
89 David McKay op cit note 87.   
90 ‘Secondary Listing on the JSE’ available at 
 http://www.glencorexstrata.com/media/news/glencorexstrata/2013/secondary-listing-on-the-jse-2/, accessed 
on 16 November 2013.  
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It remains to be seen what the impact of the listing is. Particularly of interest will be the effect 
on Glencore Xstrata’s (branded as poor) corporate governance, since it will now have to 
comply with or rather apply the progressive principals embodied in the King III Code on 
Corporate Governance or, in case of non-appliance, provide explanation why the company has 
not applied the principals.  
3.1.5 THE GIANT’S ALLEGED CORPORATE MISCONDUCT 
For a company of such dimensions pursuing the characteristic business strategies of the 
extractive industry it does not come as a surprise that it is being confronted with criticism and 
allegations.    
3.1.5.1 TAX EVASION, ENVIRONMENT AND HEALTH IMPACT IN ZAMBIA 
Mopani Copper Mines plc is an indirect subsidiary of Glencore Xstrata exploiting the copper 
deposits in Zambia. The Zambian company is held by Carlisa Investment Corporation, a joint 
venture between Glencore Xstrata (73.1 per cent), First Quantum Minerals (16.9 per cent) and 
ZCCM-IH (10 per cent).   
Glencore Xstrata’s subsidiaries allegedly performed financial and accounting manipulations 
through mechanisms such as transfer pricing and cost inflations at the Zambian mine, 
ultimately resulting in losses at Mopani Copper Mines plc. Despite record high copper prices 
Glencore Xstrata’s indirect subsidiary has always suffered losses in recent years and has 
subsequently never paid profit taxes. The Zambian government requested the independent 
accounting firm Grant Thornton to review the financial and accounting practices of Mopani 
Copper Mines plc. The investigations and clarifications led Grant Thornton to the conclusion 
that the tax avoidance conducted by Mopani Copper Mines plc have cost the Zambian 
government hundreds of millions USD of lost revenue.  
Based on Grant Thornton’s leaked draft report, the Swiss NGO “the Berne Declaration” 
together with other NGO’s from Zambia, France and Canada have filed a collective complaint 
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for breach of the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises at the competent national 
contact points in Canada and Switzerland in April 2011.91 
Besides the alleged financial and accounting manipulation, Glencore Xstrata’s indirect 
subsidiary is also accused of polluting the air through its emission of sulphur dioxide and dust 
and of polluting the drinking water through the use of sulphuric acid in order to extract the 
copper from the ore. It is alleged that Mopani Copper Mines plc has not complied with the 
Zambian standards pertaining to the emission of sulphur dioxide since the year 2000. 
Moreover, the subsidiary has not planned to take any measures until 2014 or 2015.92 
3.1.5.2 DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO: KATANGA MINING LIMITED 
Glencore Xstrata is also being criticised for doing business inter alia through the above-
mentioned subsidiary in places such as the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The central 
African Country is on position 186 of UN’s Human Development Index and hence second-
last. 93  Apparently, systematic bribery, corruption and appalling safety and human rights 
situations are said to be characteristic for business conducted and mines operated in the DRC.  
In particular Glencore Xstrata has been accused by Global Witness to have been involved in a 
potentially corrupt deal by indirectly acquiring a 37.5 per cent stake in the Kansuki copper 
mine from Dan Gertler, an Israeli business man. Gertler happens to be a friend of President 
                                                     
91 For more information see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Glencore_Xstrata and 
http://www.evb.ch/p19263.html. For more information about the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises 
see subchapter 6.2. The Swiss National Contact Point describes its approach in such a case (for more information 
see http://www.seco.admin.ch/themen/00513/00527/02584/index.html?lang=en,  November 2013) as follows: 
‘The NCP receives credible information that a company has not respected the Guidelines – or at least part 
thereof. In a preliminary examination, the NCP collects facts of the specific case (substantial content of the 
submission, justification, relevance) as well as the parties involved (identity, interest in the input) and decides 
whether a connection with the OECD Guidelines can be established. If this is the case, the NCP contacts the 
parties involved. The NCP may offer a platform for dialogue or assumes the role of a mediator and thus tries to 
contribute to an agreement between the parties. The mediation process is in general confidential and requires 
the consent of all parties. However, with respect to the results of the procedure, the NCP needs to find a balance 
between transparency and confidentiality. The NCP publishes the results of a procedure if both parties agree and 
a solution is found for a conflict. In the case where no agreement is reached, the NCP publishes this result as 
well. Furthermore, the NCP can where appropriate make recommendations.’ 
92 For more information see the Berne Declaration (ed) Commodities – Switzerland’s most dangerous business 2 
ed (2012) 105 ff.  
93 For more information see  http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics.  
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Joseph Kabila, who allegedly enabled Gertler the acquisition of the shares at an enormous 
discount.94 
Moreover, water pollution through the use of acid to extract the copper, seems to be once 
more an issue.95 
3.1.5.3 INVESTMENTS IN COLOMBIA 
As already mentioned in subchapter 3.1.3.1, Glencore Xstrata has been awarded with the 
Public Eye Award in 2008 for its treatment of water resources and its work forces, both with 
regard to its Colombian coal mines. Moreover, Glencore Xstrata’s Colombian subsidiary 
Cerrejon has been accused of forced expropriations and evacuations in a larger dimension, in 
cooperation with Colombian authorities.  
Another Colombian subsidiary, Prodeco, was apparently fined USD 700 000 in 2009 for 
environmental misconduct.96 
3.1.5.4 UN’S OIL FOR FOOD PROGRAMME  
Glencore respectively Marc Rich + Co AG certainly had a tradition under its former owner of 
dealing with rogue states such as (apartheid) South Africa, Cuba, the USSR and Iran. In the 
context of the above-mentioned UN programme that was designed to alleviate the severe 
impacts that the international sanctions developed on Iraq’s civil population, Saddam’s regime 
was allowed to export crude oil provided that the proceeds were used for humanitarian goods. 
However, besides buying the aforesaid goods, Saddam Hussein abused the programme to 
enrich himself by requiring the oil trading companies to pay a surcharge of 10 to 30 cents per 
barrel. The UN requested all oil trading companies dealing with Iraq to abstain from paying 
such illegal surcharges. Consequently, oil traders saw themselves confronted with two 
options: They could either seize to do business with Iraq or pay the illegal surcharges 
requested by Saddam’s regime.   
                                                     
94  For more information see Wikipedia’s article available at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Glencore_Xstrata, 
accessed on 16 November 2013. 
95 Ibid.  
96 Ibid.  
Glencore Xstrata plc – ‘The Biggest Company You’ve never Heard of’ 
- 51 - 
According to the Inquiry Committee consisting of Paul A. Volcker, Richard J. Goldstone and 
Mark Pieth, which had been established in 2004 by the UN to investigate the manipulations, 
Glencore allegedly chose the second option, albeit not directly but through intermediaries.97 
However, Glencore denied that any surcharges had been paid upon instruction and on behalf 
of Glencore. Moreover, Glencore claimed that it has not had any knowledge of such surcharge 
payments.98 Preliminary judicial investigation lead by Switzerland’s Attorney-General in the 
aftermath of the UN report led to the finding that there is indeed a “lack of culpable 
information” and no further criminal proceedings have been instituted against Glencore.99 
3.1.6 INTERIM CONCLUSION 
The largest diversified commodities trader in the world and the fourth largest mining 
company. Position twelve in the Fortune Global 500 list, valued at USD 65–80 billion. A 
company running more than 90 offices in over 50 countries and operating more than 150 
mining and metallurgical sites, oil production facilities and agricultural sites, thereby providing 
jobs to approximately 190 000 people. From an economic perspective, only the employment 
of superlatives seems to be appropriate to describe the company’s success, dimensions and 
subsequently powers.  
It does almost come as a surprise that a colossus of such magnitude often operating in 
countries with weak governance and weak institutions is not being confronted with more 
allegations in terms of corporate misconduct.  
Because a multinational of such economic dimensions has massive impacts on the various 
communities it operates in, it can, and in fact does, impact the society beyond the local 
municipalities. Moreover, its business in general and its exploitation processes respectively 
the way they are conducted in particular also heavily influence the (natural) environment. 
Needless to say that this comes along with an enormous responsibility in terms of 
environmental, social and governance issues.  
                                                     
97 The Report on the Manipulation of the Oil-for-Food Programme, 27 October 2005, 3, 12 ff., 144.  
98 Ibid at 144.  
99For more information see http://www.parlament.ch/d/suche/seiten/geschaefte.aspx?gesch_id=20063428 and 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/02/25/us-glencore-idUSTRE71O1DC20110225, both accessed on 18 
November 2013.  
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4 THE ACCOUNTABILITY GAP 
‘We invest in many countries and we have many opportunities around the world where we 
can invest our money. Governments are free to make their rules as they wish but once they 
make their rules we will decide if that’s a place that justifies a big investment.’ 
Ivan Glasenberg, CEO of Glencore Xstrata, 2013100 
In the light of the aforesaid, the question has to be raised if and how the negative side effects 
of multinationals’ activities can be curtailed. Moreover, the question arises whether and how 
globally operating companies can be held accountable for their misconduct. Especially their 
enormous economic weight and thus their influence on the various societies and their political 
framework illustrates their hazard potential in terms of environmental, social and governance 
issues. While the world economy has rapidly globalised, its political and judicial control 
remains confined by national borders. 
4.1 THE ACCOUNTABILITY GAP 
4.1.1 DIVERGENCE BETWEEN RESPONSIBILITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
Firstly, it should be noted that legally there is no such thing as a multinational company, since 
companies are considered to be legal persons of the private law, i.e. are bound and governed 
by the law of the State in which each company is domiciled. This is where their legal 
personalities derive from. ‘Companies are accountable (...) mainly through the governments 
of those countries where the companies conduct their activities.’ 101  Subsequently, each 
subsidiary of a (multinational) parent company can have its own nationality. Thus a 
                                                     
100 Statement of Ivan Glasenberg in the context of the secondary listing of Glencore Xstrata at the JSE available 
at http://www.bdlive.co.za/business/mining/2013/11/14/glencore-lists-on-jse-with-ceo-glasenberg-warning-
about-mining-laws, accessed on 17. November 2013. 
101 Koenig-Archibugi Mathias ‘Transnational corporations and public accountability’ in Held David and Koenig-
Archibugi Mathias (eds) Global Governance and public accountability (2004) 235.  
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multinational company is a network of companies incorporated under the laws of different 
states. 
For the time being, it therefore has to be acknowledged that multinational’s business activities 
are subject to and governed by diverse national legal systems and frameworks. 
Furthermore, it must be noted that globalisation has fundamentally altered the relationship 
between the national state and the private sector, in as much as multinationals can hardly be 
controlled by national governments having only the traditional (territorially limited) legal, 
police and policy instruments at their disposal, which is why Percy Barnevik, former CEO of 
ABB Asea Brown Boveri Ltd, has spoken of the so-called “accountability gap”.102 This also 
seems to be the notion of Beth Stephens stating that ‘There is a gap between the economic 
reality and the legal tools available to hold transnational enterprises accountable for their 
actions.’103 
4.1.2 THE CAUSE OF THE ACCOUNTABILITY GAP 
This accountability gap is evidenced, for example, in the context of subsidiaries. Despite their 
own legal personality deriving from the respective national law, subsidiaries are regularly 
inspected and instructed by the parent company and thus do not have any independent power 
of decision. Now, assuming that a subsidiary is contravening against international economic 
law upon instruction of its parent company, it does indeed seem inequitable to deny an 
accountability of the parent company. However, the revelation of the legal status of a 
controlled company as well as the causal connection between its actions and the inputs and 
instructions of the parent company can be problematic and difficult to prove, and 
international law does not provide for a regulation applicable to a transnational corporation 
as a whole. 
This is attributed to the cross-border activities and the flexible behaviour of multinationals 
which allows them to bypass national legal frameworks and to choose – in accordance with 
                                                     
102 Hans Galli ‘Interview mit Percy Barnevik’ Der Bund 6 February 1996 at 5.  
103 Stephens Beth ‘The Amorality of Profit: Transnational Corporations and Human Rights’ (2002) 20 Berkeley 
Journal of International Law, 54. 
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their economic maxims – countries with low social, environmental and labour standards as 
economically most profitable production sites. The more they scatter their operations across 
the world, the less power and control a single government has towards them. The global 
operations of multinationals are being faced by territorially limited norms of single states. This 
has certainly contributed to the shift in power from nation states to multinationals that has 
been observed in the past decades. Glasenberg’s statement quoted above illustrates this.104 
In short, a multinational enterprise ‘is global, and the nation state local.’105 With regard to the 
accountability of multinationals for problematic business practices this in turn means that a 
control by national regulations is increasingly difficult. This tendency is further reinforced by 
the following developments: 
1. The global competition between states in attracting large multinational investors may 
mean that the states are forced to propose (legal) frameworks which, while being 
conducive for to the profit maximisation of multinational companies, will be detrimental 
for national environmental and social standards. In fact, many multinationals profit from 
inadequate standards in third world countries allowing them to significantly cut their costs, 
while the states cannot effectively leverage the standards because of the fear of a 
disinvestment.106 
2. The performance of judicial systems of developing countries with corrupt governments 
and / or unstable political conditions and weak institutions is often unsatisfactorily or is 
characterised by a lack of transparency. This impedes the effective enforcement and 
control of possibly even existing social and ecological standards massively. This results in 
a little significance of such standards and norms for powerful multinationals. 
                                                     
104 Glasenberg has – notably in the context of Glencore Xstrata’s listing on JSE – threatened to disinvest from 
South Africa, should the amendment of the mining laws the South African Government is contemplating about 
not suit Glencore Xstrata.  
105 Stephen J. Kobrin ‘Sovereignty@Bay: Globalization, Multinational Enterprise, and the International Political 
System’ available at https://mgmt.wharton.upenn.edu/files/?whdmsaction=public:main.file&fileID=4002, 
accessed on 19 November 2013.  
106 Again reference is made to the quotation of Glasenberg above, although South Africa certainly does not have 
to be considered a country with low environmental (and social) standards. But the threat of disinvestment and / 
or relocation proves to be effective, independently from whether the threatened state is a developing nation, an 
emerging nation or a developed nation.  
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3. A binding global framework requiring multinationals to comply with certain agreed 
Standards of conduct and demanding them to refrain from ecologically, socially and 
ethically unsound business practices is entirely missing. 107  An attempt by the UN to 
develop and agree amongst the member countries, on a legally binding code of conduct 
for transnational corporations, with the aim ‘to establish mechanisms of accountability, at 
the same global scale as the activities of TNC's’108 failed after decades of negotiations in 
1992 due to a conflict of interest, mainly between the capital-importing and the capital-
exporting states. 109  Thus, up to today, there are no binding global principals for 
multinationals and subsequently no supranational institution demanding and enforcing 
compliance. It has to be attested that a certain (and in some cases massive) imbalance 
between states and multinationals is in fact a reality. 
 
4. As legal entities of the national private law, the international law status of multinational 
companies is debated controversially. In accordance with modern concepts multinationals 
do not only have rights, but also obligations. A responsibility of the private sector, based 
on international law, seems in principle to be conceivable. Whether the legal reality will 
actually customise to this notion, remains to be seen. The discussion to what extent 
multinationals are bound by international obligations in terms of human rights, is in full 
swing. In any case, the current system of international law demands that – at least in the 
context of aggravated violations of human rights – states in fact do have an obligation to 
ensure compliance in their territory. This includes the obligation to prevent violations of 
human rights by third parties, in casu to prevent human rights violations by transnational 
corporations. Otherwise the state – at least in theory and apart from a possible liability of 
the multinational in question – potentially has to bear the responsibility under 
international law. It follows that a state might be held to account for questionable business 
                                                     
107 The same is not true however for a non-binding framework. The UN Global Compact, launched in the year 
2000, does provide standards for multinationals. However, the ten principals are not of binding character and 
not very detailed.  
108 Koenig-Archibugi Mathias op cit note 101 at 251 et seq. In principal, the idea was to directly impose the same 
human rights duties on companies based on international law as for countries.  
109 For more information see Ilias Bantekas ’Corporate Social Responsibility in International Law’ (2004) 22 Boston 
University International Law Journal 318.  
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practices conducted by multinationals, while the latter might be able to evade 
international justice.110 
4.1.3 INTERIM CONCLUSION 
Considering the outlined international and political background, it has to be stated that the 
conditions under which multinationals currently can be held accountable for the negative side 
effects of globalisation, seem to be vague and unclear. As mentioned above, there is no 
supranational law that applies in cases where, for example, parent companies and their 
subsidiaries are involved in corporate misconduct. This has led to the formation of grey areas 
which in legal terms are not clearly defined. An adequate national legislation is in some cases 
non-existent, not applicable or simply not being enforced, and international law does not 
provide for a satisfactory control and remedy at all. 
Strategic alliances and closer relations with suppliers and sub-contractors (“outsourcing”) 
increasingly blurs the traditional corporate boundaries.111 Hence the question arises how to 
deal with misconduct performed by suppliers and sub-contractors. Even in cases of a strong 
involvement of suppliers and sub-contractors a legal nexus between the latter and their 
clients, the multinationals, can often not be established which is why multinationals cannot 
be held (legally) accountable for the formers misconduct.   
In summary, globalisation has led to a loss of power of national states. Whereas multinationals 
through their subsidiaries and global production shifts and the inclusion of suppliers and sub-
contractors have burst the chains and fetters of national boundaries, no equivalent 
development has happened on a national respectively supranational level – there is no 
supranational institution that encounters the multinationals. Because of the lack of such a 
development respectively based on the fact that the question of whether the individual state 
laws still provide an effective tool for the control of multinationals has to be denied, 
globalisation has caused a disequilibrium enabling shrewd multinationals to operate in a 
power vacuum.   
                                                     
110 Stephens Beth op cit note 103 at 83. 
111 This is also a concern of the OECD. See eg the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises.  
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5 LEGALLY BINDING APPROACHES TO CLOSE THE GAP 
‘It is necessary only for the good man to do nothing for evil to triumph’ 
Statement attributed to Edmund Burke, 18th century Irish political philosopher and statesman 
As illustrated above in 4.1.23. a binding code of conduct for multinationals could not be agreed 
on so far on an international level – and the author doubts that the national states will be 
willing to sacrifice a part of their sovereignty in the short to medium term enabling the 
enactment of binding international laws.  
Considering the divergence between the global operating range of multinationals and the 
limited jurisdiction nation-states have, at a first glance it might seem difficult to find an 
adequate approach to close the gap on a non-international level. However, the customary 
international law is considered to provide for a tool enabling nation-states to (at least in 
theory) directly or indirectly influence the multinationals’ behaviour.   
5.1 ENACTMENT OF BINDING EXTRA-TERRITORIAL LAW 
The territorial sovereignty of a nation-state includes the competence to legislate. This 
competence is in principle limited to the territory of the nation-state in question. In special 
cases, however, a nation-state may legitimately expand its regulatory powers to extra-
territorial areas. This requires a legitimising reference point, since without a such, the 
application of national law on extra-territorial incidents would violate the international 
principle prohibiting the intervention in other states’ affairs.  
The principle of active personality is considered to be an eligible reference point. The 
competence to legislate is thereby linked to a natural person’s nationality, whereas in the case 
of a legal person the registered office /headquarters is serving as a reference point.112 
                                                     
112 In determining the nationality of a legal person, mainly formal aspects are valued. 
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According to the principle of active personality a state may ‘regulate the conduct of its own 
citizens abroad (...), but not however, enforce these rules abroad (...).’113 
Hence, a state is in principle authorized to regulate undesirable business conduct of its legal 
entities abroad thereby conceivably imposing extraterritorial liability in cases of a breach of 
the law, and, if the misconduct has not been subject to legal proceedings in the host country, 
pursue the perpetrator in front of its national courts.114 
Based on the foregoing, inter alia the following approaches have been developed:115 
In 1999, a socialist parliamentarian proposed to establish universal jurisdiction for Belgian 
courts with regard to (i) multinationals having assets in Belgium that have (ii) violated human 
rights standards. The proposal was rejected inter alia in consideration of the possible adverse 
effects on Belgian economy.  
Likewise, in 1999 the European Parliament submitted a resolution to the European Council 
and the European Commission to provide for a legally binding ‘European code of conduct 
governing company operations worldwide which would incorporate existing minimum 
international standards on human rights, minorities, indigenous peoples, working conditions, 
                                                     
113 Tina Kempin Reuter & Michael Frei Repetitorium Völkerrecht 2 ed (2012) 62.  
114 For example, a country may enact legal standards prohibiting bribery of foreign officials by corporations. John 
Ruggie demands in principle 2 of his final ‘Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the 
issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises’ dated 21 March 2011 
(Ruggie Principles), that ‘States should set out clearly the expectation that all business enterprises domiciled in  
their territory and/or jurisdiction respect human rights throughout their operations.’ He asserts that currently 
‘States are not generally required under international human rights law to regulate the extraterritorial activities 
of businesses domiciled in their territory and/or jurisdiction. Nor are they generally prohibited from doing so, 
provided there is a recognized jurisdictional basis.’ Moreover, Ruggie states that ‘There are strong policy reasons 
for home States to set out clearly the expectation that businesses respect human rights abroad, especially where 
the State itself is involved in or supports those businesses.’ See also footnote 119. 
115  For a more elaborate discussion see Chatham House ‘Human rights and Transnational corporations: 





w&bvm=bv.56988011,d.eW0&cad=rja, accessed on 25 November 2013.  
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the environment and anti-corruption measures.’116 The aim was to enact a law demanding 
‘socially and environmentally sustainable operations (…)’ enabling legal actions against 
perpetrators who ‘failed in their basic duty of care.’ 117  However, in 2001, the European 
Commission favoured, in its Green Paper Promoting a European Framework for Corporate 
Social Responsibility, a voluntary approach to Corporate Social Responsibility and the 
European Parliament’s proposal was not followed up.118 However, it is expected that the 
Ruggie Principles119 will give new impetus to the debate in the EU and its future policy in terms 
of Corporate Social Responsibility. It remains to be seen if the European Parliament’s 
preference for a binding regulatory approach will be taken up by the European Commission 
which favoured a voluntary approach in its Green Paper.120 
The Australian Corporate Code of Conduct Bill 2000 attempted to establish standards on the 
conduct of Australian transnational corporations by requiring them to (also) comply abroad 
with environmental, labour, health and safety and human right standards. This law would have 
also applied to subsidiaries and subcontractors. However, the Parliamentary Joint Statutory 
Committee considered the draft to be ‘impracticable and unwarranted (…)’, moreover 
‘unnecessary and unworkable (…)’ and concluded that its imperialistic tendencies might 
potentially damage foreign relations and encourage Australian multinationals to relocate to 
other jurisdictions.121  The Australian Parliament subsequently rejected the proposed law.  
                                                     
116 ‘European criteria for European companies operating in developing countries LDCs: towards a European code 
of conduct’ available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/popups/ficheprocedure.do?id=16279, accessed on 
25 November 2013.  
117 Ibid.  
118 For more information see Andreas Rühmkorf ‘The Promotion of Corporate Social Responsibility in English 




bv.56988011,d.eW0, accessed on 25 November 2013.  
119 See footnote 114. The formal terminology of the Ruggie Principles is ‘United Nations Guiding Principles on 
Business and Human Rights’ and they set out principles for states and companies in terms of human rights based 
on a three pillar implementation concept: (i) a state duty to protect human rights, (ii) a corporate responsibility 
to respect human rights and (iii) access to remedy for victims of corporate misconduct.    
120 Constitutionally, a proposal by the European Commission to the European Parliament to legislate would be 
required therefore.  
121 Parliamentary Joint Statutory Committee on Corporations and Securities, Report on the Corporate Code of 
Conduct Bill 2000 para 4.5 et seq.  
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5.2 FOREIGN DIRECT LIABILITY 
The Parliamentary Joint Statutory Committee referred in its report to an already existing 
possibility to hold multinationals liable for their business practices conducted abroad by 
noting  ‘that existing case law provides avenues for foreign plaintiffs to seek redress for wrongs 
committed by Australian corporations overseas (…)’122, commonly referred to as “foreign 
direct liability”.  
In principle, this terminology stands for legal actions being pursued against a multinational on 
the basis of the home country’s domestic tort law. The difficulties pertaining to the separate 
legal personality of the parent company’s subsidiary having conducted the wrongdoings in the 
host-country are circumvented by eg proving a negligent behaviour of the former, alleging 
that it did not apply the required duty of care. This is due to the fact that parent companies 
allegedly ‘have direct responsibilities toward third parties in those host countries (…)’, based 
on their ‘knowledge of, and influence on, the operations of its subsidiaries or business 
partners.’123 
In the examples of corporate misconduct provided for in subchapter 2.2.5 the behaviour of 
Shell and Trafigura has led to claims in the Netherlands and the UK based on the tort laws of 
the respective countries.124 
However, until recently a 224-years old US federal statute originally envisaged to protect 
diplomats and signed by President George Washington emerged as driving force behind the 
foreign direct liability cases-trend. The talk is of the Alien Tort Statute (ATS), a federal statute 
dated 1789. It stipulates that ‘The district court shall have original jurisdiction of any civil 
action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of 
                                                     
122 Ibid para 4.50.  
123 Liesbeth F.H. Enneking ‘Crossing The Atlantic? The Political and Legal Feasibility of European Foreign Direct 
Liability Cases’ (2007) Volume 40, Number 4 The George Washington International Law Review at 924. 
124 Whilst the largest class action brought before a UK court with 29 614 claimants has been settled (amicably) in 
September 2009 obliging Trafigura to pay out GBP 30 million, the case brought before a Dutch court (district 
Court of the Hague) against Shell’s Nigerian subsidiary in the case of two oil spills in Nigeria ended in holding the 
latter civilly liable on 30 January 2013. However, all the claims against the parent company were dismissed. For 
a more elaborate discussion of the concept of foreign direct liability see Liesbeth Francisca Hubertina Enneking’s 
theses Foreign Direct Liability and Beyond.  
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the United States.’125 Broadly speaking, these rather unspectacular 33 words arguably provide 
for a tool that can be applied in cases where international law has been violated, thereby 
granting universal jurisdiction to the federal US courts. Hence it allows citizens not domiciled 
in the US to seek remedy in federal US courts for human rights violations committed outside 
the US. 
After a long sleeping beauty slumber lasting nearly 200 years, the statute had been 
“rediscovered” in 1980 in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala.126 Several law suits against natural persons 
allegedly having violated human-rights were to be followed. However, until recently, it was 
controversially discussed if the ATS does also apply to corporations. Several lawsuits against 
multinationals under the ATS have been lodged, amongst them lawsuits of the Khulumani 
Support Group South Africa against more than 20 multinationals for wrongdoings during the 
apartheid era and against Royal Dutch Petroleum (Kioble v. Royal Dutch Petroleum) for the 
collaboration with the Nigerian military regime referred to in subchapter2.2.5.127 Many of 
them have ended in profitable settlement agreements.  
Unsurprisingly, the dramatic rise in human rights lawsuits since the 1980s with no direct link 
to the US has led to harsh critique both within and outside the US. Amongst the concerns 
expressed is the fear of an interference by courts with the US government’s foreign policy128 
caused by the extraterritorial nature of the ATS making persons and potentially companies 
                                                     
125 § 1350 of title 28 of the United States Code.  
126 Two Paraguayan plaintiffs (living in the US) sued a former Paraguayan police chief (also resident in the US) for 
having tortured and murdered a family member. For more information see 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alien_Tort_Statute.  
127 The Khulamani Support Group was established in 1995 by victims of the apartheid policies and their families. 
In 2002, the group filed putative class action suits in the US based on the ATS against multinationals such as 
Daimler, Ford, IBM and Swiss multinationals Oerlikon Bührle, Credit Suisse and UBS. The multinationals were 
accused of having facilitated human rights violations committed by the apartheid regime by eg selling computers 
and cars to the South African Government. In the light of these events, the Swiss Federal Council on 16 April 2003 
even decided to restrict the access to its official archives in order to prevent Swiss enterprises from being 
disadvantaged in the lawsuits in the US by the revelation of potentially “uncomfortable facts”. 
The Nigerian plaintiffs in Kioble v. Royal Dutch Petroleum alleged that they were victims of severe human rights 
violation (murder, torture, deprivation of property, etc.) conducted by the Nigerian Government, however in 
collaboration with Royal Dutch Petroleum.  
128 South African President Thabo Mbeki for example heavily criticised the lawsuits in the US based on ATS 
arguing that it interferes with the objectives of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. See Meron Tesfa 
Michael ‘Moment of Truth: South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission Closes its Doors’ Worldpress.org 
2 March 2003 available at http://www.worldpress.org/Africa/1077.cfm (‘We consider it completely 
unacceptable that matters that are central to the future of our country should be adjudicated in foreign courts.’). 
Legally Binding Approaches to Close the Gap 
- 62 - 
around the world subject to US law without their knowledge, the encouragement of forum 
shopping and linked to it an unduly burden for US courts having to deal with “foreign issues”, 
an adverse impact on the competitiveness of US-based multinationals and many more. 
Consequently, critics have demanded the US Congress to repeal or at least restrict the scope 
of ATS, some of them alleging that it ‘would make more sense for the Group of G7 or the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) to launch a comprehensive 
review of corporate responsibility and liability.129 
On the other side human-rights organisations and other activists perceived the ATS to be the 
main driving forces behind foreign direct liability, regarding it as the most promising approach 
to hold multinationals accountable and have therefore set great hope and expectations into 
this statute.   
However, the international human rights movement has suffered a major setback when the 
US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in the causa Kioble v. Royal Dutch Petroleum in 
September 2010 came to the following conclusion:   
‘We hold, under the precedents of the Supreme Court and our own Court over the past three 
decades, that in ATS suits alleging violations of customary international law, the scope of 
liability — who is liable for what — is determined by customary international law itself. 
Because customary international law consists of only those norms that are specific, universal, 
and obligatory in the relations of States inter se, and because no corporation has ever been 
subject to any form of liability (whether civil or criminal) under the customary international 
law of human rights, we hold that corporate liability is not a discernable — much less 
universally recognized — norm of customary international law that we may apply pursuant to 
the ATS. Accordingly, plaintiffs’ ATS claims must be dismissed for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction.’130 
                                                     
129 Mark C. Medish and Daniel R. Lucich ‘Trying an Old Law’ The New York Times 1 June 2009 available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/02/opinion/02iht-edmedish.html?ref=global&_r=0, accessed on 26 
November 2013.   
130 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, decision by the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit of 17 September 
2010, 1 et seq. 
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On 17 April 2013, the US Supreme court upon appeal by the plaintiffs has put the “final nail 
into the coffin” by affirming the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit’s decision and 
concluding that the ATS does not apply to human rights violation committed by corporations 
in foreign territories.  
In the light of the Supreme Court’s decision, inter alia the Khulumani Support Group’s 
(apartheid) lawsuit was rejected on 21 August 2013 by the US Court of Appeal for the Second 
Circuit.   
However, this does not spell the end to the enforcement of sound corporate behaviour based 
on tort law. But surely the most promising “road” to foreign direct liability has been closed. 
What remains is the enforcement of sound corporate conduct through claims before US state 
(but not federal) courts and other courts of the Western hemisphere based on the general 
principles of tort law.131 ‘Although this type of tort-based litigation may not engender the level 
of moral condemnation that claims pertaining to corporate human rights violations on the 
basis of the Alien Tort Statute do, it does allow for claims in relation to a much broader range 
of people- and planet-related norm violations resulting from multinational corporations' 
transnational activities.’132 
  
                                                     
131 An example is Lubbe v. Cape Plc, supposedly the most prominent case in the UK. 3000 mainly South African 
plaintiffs having been exposed to asbestos in South African mines during apartheid filed a lawsuit in the UK 
against the parent company alleging that the latter has violated its duty of care. The defendant sought to stay 
the proceedings based on forum non conveniens. In 2003, the case was settled.    
132 Liesbeth Francisca Hubertina Enneking Foreign Direct Liability and Beyond  (published thesis, University of 
Utrecht, 2012) Preface x. 
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5.3 INTERIM CONCLUSION 
The general principles of tort law seem to provide a suitable avenue in certain cases to seek 
redress for corporate misconduct committed abroad. However the scope is very limited and 
there is a plethora of obstacles that have not been discussed here, amongst them the “forum 
non conveniens-doctrine” in the case of common law countries as well as the Brussels I 
Regulation in case of EU member countries.133 To the best knowledge of the author, all actions 
against parent companies based on the concept of foreign direct liability – both in the US and 
in Europe – have been rejected so far. 134  The same would be very likely to happen in 
Switzerland. 135  As a rule, the bringing of action against a Swiss parent company for 
transgressions of its subsidiary committed abroad is precluded. Even a wholly owned 
subsidiary is legally independent from its holding and a fundamental responsibility on the part 
of the latter for the acts of the former does not exist under Swiss law.   
It has to be admitted though that this statutory concept (having its origin in the 19th century) 
of a legally, economically and organisationally independent company (subsidiary) does 
generally no longer reflect the economic reality. As a rule, the legal independence of 
subsidiaries is de facto reduced to a minimum or entirely absent. Moreover, the concept of 
piercing the corporate veil is much discussed in theory but outmost restrictively applied in 
practice. 
                                                     
133 Both limit the court’s jurisdictions. For an elaborate discussion see ibid at 145 ff.  
134 Inter alia also the action against Royal Dutch Shell in the Netherlands for the environmental damages caused 
by its subsidiary in Nigeria (see footnote 124). According to the Dutch court, (only) Shell’s Nigerian subsidiary is 
responsible and liable.  
135 Insofar as can be ascertained, only one action against a multinational has been brought before a Swiss court. 
In 2004, a Gypsy organisation filed a lawsuit against International Business Machines (IBM) in Geneva for having 
provided the Nazis with a punch card technology through its German subsidiary between 1939 and 1945, thereby 
allegedly facilitating holocaust. IBM had its European headquarters in Geneva during the relevant time. However, 
in 2006, the case was dismissed due to prescription. For more information see the judgement of the Swiss Federal 
Court (the country’s highest court), BGE 132 III 661, available at 
http://www.bger.ch/index/juridiction/jurisdiction-inherit-template/jurisdiction-recht/jurisdiction-recht-
leitentscheide1954.htm. South Africa with its apartheid history on the other side, has been involved in foreign 
direct liability cases as place of corporate misconduct performed by various subsidiaries of foreign parent 
companies, and therefore rather as source of complaints abroad than as forum where South African parent 
companies have been tried to be hold to account. But in principal, considering that South Africa is a common law 
country, it is conceivable that it provides a forum for foreign direct liability cases based on tort law.   
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Besides legal difficulties practical concerns confine the applicability of foreign direct liability 
cases. It seems infinitely more difficult to legally assess transgressions committed abroad and 
to moreover establish the necessary and legally relevant link to the parent company (eg 
negligent behaviour), allowing the judge to apply the home countries standards and to 
ultimately hold the parent company to account. Furthermore, it has to be doubted that the 
countries currently providing suitable forums are willing to ease the access to their courts, 
thereby burdening their legal court systems, possibly limiting their latitude in terms of foreign 
policies and taking the risk of competitive disadvantages.  
The same is true of course with regard to the enactment of new laws having extraterritorial 
effect. Hence the two related approaches do provide for a valid tool to regulate the 
multinational’s behaviour abroad to a certain extent, but is unlikely that they become more 
than small puzzle pieces in the greater picture.  
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6 NON-BINDING PRINCIPLE BASED FRAMEWORKS 
‘As a lawyer of many years experience I can tell you that you can get around a rule – but it’s 
not so easy to get around a principle’ 
Professor Mervyn King, 2012136 
The governance of corporations is not limited to a framework of statutory means. As 
elaborated in the previous chapters, the enactment of a statutory regulation on an 
international level, allowing multinationals to be held to account, does not seem to be realistic 
over the short to medium term. However, alternatives exist. Over the past two decades, more 
and more organisations, committees and countries have developed sets of voluntary 
principles contributing to good corporate governance. 137  In some cases, these codes 
embodying general guidelines of best practice are moreover underpinned by statutory law 
(hybrid approaches). In other words, another conceivable approach to encounter the existing 
accountability gap are non-binding, principle based guidelines reflecting the notions and 
concepts of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) or Corporate Citizenship (CC). 138  Such 
guidelines are devoted to directly or indirectly influence, regulate and eventually control the 
behaviour of multinational actors and in fact exist on both an international and national level. 
                                                     
136 Jess Schulschenk ‘Interview Summary Report‘ 14.  
137 On the basis of Jean Jacques du Plessis’ definition of corporate governance (Principles of Contemporary 
Corporate Governance, 6), the author defines Corporate Governance as a “system of directing and a process of 
controlling a company and its organs and balancing the various interests of internal stakeholders and other 
parties that may be affected by the company’s conduct in order to ensure responsible (social) behaviour and to 
achieve the maximum efficiency and profitability for a corporation enabling a sustainable long term growth”. The 
origins of the corporate governance debate are traced back to the famous debate between Prof. E. Merrick Dodd 
and Prof. Adolf Berle in the 1930’s, inter alia dealing with the problems caused by the separation of ownership 
and control.    
138 In brief, CSR and CC are concepts fostering the positive impacts of the company’s business activities on the 
various stakeholders and moreover assuming responsibility for the negative impacts. A more detailed discussion 
of these very interesting concepts is however beyond the scope of this work.    
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Principle based (ideally multilateral) guidelines represent a mild regulatory approach, thereby 
waiving a sovereign and legally binding effect and instead appealing to the responsibility and 
an ethical behaviour of the individuals and the corporate actors, demanding the latter to 
comply with (minimum) standards set out by an (international or national) organisation or 
committee.  
6.1 UNILATERAL GUIDING PRINCIPLES: KING REPORT III AND CRISA 
A weak or non-existent corporate governance has been identified as causal for massive 
corporate scandals and failures in the 1980s and 1990s by a committee inter alia 
commissioned by the London Stock Exchange and led by Lord Adrian Cadbury. The 
committee’s recommendations were set out in the Cadbury report published in 1992. 
Numerous other reports were to follow, altogether forming the UK Corporate Governance 
Code which requests listed companies to disclose how they have complied with the principles 
set out therein and, in case of non-compliance, explain why they did not comply (‘comply or 
explain’ approach).  
After having jettisoned the political exclusivity approach being inherent to the apartheid 
system in 1990, the Institute of Directors in Southern Africa convoked a committee being 
representative of the new South Africa and named after its chairman, Professor Mervyn E. 
King. The King Report containing the King Code I was issued by the committee in 1994 and 
heralded the beginning of a new era in corporate governance, being the first code worldwide 
to the knowledge of the author to opt for an approach also best reflecting the new South 
Africa: The stakeholder inclusive approach.139 In 1995, compliance with the King Code became 
a listing requirement.  
                                                     
139 The stakeholder inclusive approach in principle reflects the view that a company is not a mere economic 
vehicle to generate shareholders’ wealth. Subsequently and unlike in the case of the shareholder primacy 
approach, the shareholder’s interests do not precede. According to the stakeholder inclusive approach, a 
company’s board is in fact obliged to consider and recognise all the legitimate interests of the various 
stakeholders such as employees, suppliers, customers, regulators, the environment, the community the 
company operates in, etc. It follows that a company also has a responsibility towards inter alia the society and 
the environment.   
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In 2002 and 2009, the King Code was revised and updated (King Code II and III).140 King Code III 
inter alia introduced a new holistic form of reporting about the company’s performance in the 
triple context, thereby departing from the traditional (financial) reporting standards providing 
the reader with a very selective, one-dimensional overview of the company’s performance 
(bottom line). In brief, the companies are now required to also report on how they have 
created value with regard to social and environmental issues, hence the triple bottom line 
(profit, people, planet).141 
King Code III’s philosophy in principle consists of three key elements: (i) ethical and effective 
leadership, (ii) sustainability and (iii) good corporate citizenship. An ethical leader considers 
ethical values such as transparency, fairness, responsibility and accountability. He or she is 
concerned about the ecological footprint and therefore promotes sustainability, the ethical 
and economic imperative of this century. He or she is aware of the impact the company has 
on the various communities and the environment it operates in and subsequently accepts the 
responsibilities linked therewith.   
In the author’s view, the King Report III is currently the most sophisticated, aspirational, 
progressive and holistic corporate governance concept existing and is likely to serve as source 
of inspiration around the world in the short to medium term.  
Last century’s ownership revolution, which has made many of us – through our pension funds 
– indirect (and often unaware) shareholders of some of the largest companies, has led to a 
very dispersed shareholding, thereby even more accentuating the problems caused by a 
separation of ownership and control due to an increase of managerial powers and partially 
absent institutional investors, the latter omitting to fulfil their conceived functions in the check 
and balance system.  
Whereas King Code III identifies the board of directors as the focal point of corporate 
governance, the complementary Code for Responsible Investing in South Africa’s (CRISA) focus 
                                                     
140 The King Report containing King Code III is available at http://www.iodsa.co.za/?page=kingIII.   
141  Integrated reporting is considered to be a promising tool by the author. A thorough consideration and 
discussion of this approach is, however, beyond the scope of this work.  
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is on the institutional investors and shareholders.142 This reflects the notion that some of the 
recent corporate failures in relation to governance have been at least partly caused by 
apathetic and unengaged institutional investors. Institutional investors such as pension funds, 
commissioned to represent the long term interest of their beneficiaries and holding 
approximately one-third of South Africa’s equity, are predestined to successfully play an 
influential role by ensuring the implementation of long term strategies and demanding (and 
monitoring) compliance with the King Code.143 They have the power to ensure that the check 
and balance system serves its purpose.144 
During the past two decades, corporate governance has come to the fore internationally. 
Despite corporate failures such as Swissair caused by its pathetic expansion strategy (the so-
called “hunter strategy”), the Swiss equivalent to the King Code, the Swiss Code of Best 
Practice for Corporate Governance published in 2002, proves to be mediocre and rather non-
aspirational.145 
6.2 MULTILATERAL GUIDING PRINCIPLES: THE OECD GUIDELINES FOR 
MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES 
Since the 1970s, inter alia international organisations and NGO's have contemplated and 
created legally non-binding codices and guidelines for global economic actors. ‘Since a hard 
legal answer was (...) impossible – governments chose the way of “soft“ law, namely of 
                                                     
142 The Code for Responsible Investing in South Africa is available at http://www.iodsa.co.za/?page=crisa.  
143  Typical institutional investors include banks, insurance companies, hedge funds and retirement funds. 
Institutional investors hold approximately 55 per cent of the equity in Switzerland, although two-thirds are 
foreign institutional investors. For more details see Tobias Weichsler Corporate Governance und Shareholder 
Value– eine Empirische Untersuchung am Beispiel der Schweiz (PhD thesis, University of St. Gallen, 2009) 7.  
144 However, not everyone seems to long for more institutional investors and shareholders in general to become 
more active and involved, as the following quote, from an anonymous sceptical Canadian CEO(SR Leighton & 
Donald H Thain Making Boards Work (1997) 6, shows: ‘The key directors on our board all know what I have done 
to make our company perform. They made me the CEO because I was the best candidate they could find. I have 
worked my butt off at great sacrifice to my family and personal life to transform this company and make it 
perform better than it ever had before. I don’t need any of their penetrating questions or second-guessing. 
Thanks to my own tough bargaining, I am financially secure and set for life. If they can get someone better than 
me to do the job, then that’s what they should do. Until then let them back off and stay out of my way.’ 
145 The Swiss Code of Best Practice has been developed by the Swiss Business Federation and is a voluntary set 
of principles on a “comply or explain” basis addressed to listed companies. However, compliance is not a listing 
requirement. It is available at 
 http://www.economiesuisse.ch/de/PDF%20Download%20Files/PosPap_CorpLaw_20020627_e.pdf. 
Non-Binding Principle Based Frameworks 
- 70 - 
voluntary guidelines (...) addressed to multinational enterprises.’ 146  One of the earliest 
multilateral approaches taken by an international organisation was the development of 
OECD’s Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (hereinafter “Guidelines”).   
6.2.1 INTRODUCTION AND SYSTEM OF THE GUIDELINES 
The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) today consists of 34 
member states that commit themselves to democratic governments and market economy.147 
Its Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises are considered to be one of the most important 
multilateral codes of conduct for multinationals. Besides the 34 member states, eight 
additional states have signed the Guidelines.148 
The Guidelines are an important example of a voluntary international code of conduct. They 
were designed by an OECD Committee in cooperation with trade unions and employers' 
associations in 1975 and were, after being annexed to the "Declaration on International 
Investment and Multinational Enterprises", adopted by the then 23 OECD member countries. 
The Guidelines were last subjected to a thorough revision in 2000 and to a minor revision in 
2011. The implementation of the Guidelines has been deliberately designed in two levels: 
While the guiding principles – with regard to multinationals – only enjoy the status of 
recommendations 149 its implementation by national governments – specifically the 
establishment of National   (NCPs) – is binding. 
This 2-stage system illustrates the comprehensive approach of the Guidelines. The code also 
includes complaints and inspection procedures, which offers interested parties the 
opportunity to submit a complaint pertaining to a possible breach of the Guidelines by a 
multinational to a NCP. The latter is there by not in a judgmental, but rather mediating 
                                                     
146 Blanpain Roger & Colucci Michele The Globalization of Labour Standards, The Soft Law Track, Global Compact, 
ILO Principles, NAFTA Agreement, OECD Guidelines (2004) 120. 
147 The OECD was founded in 1948 as an Organisation for European Economic Cooperation in France. It was 
originally destined to assist the administration and implementation of the Marshall plan. Upon its reformation in 
1961, the organisation changed its name.  
148 Argentina, Brazil, Egypt, Latvia, Lithuania, Morocco, Peru and Romania.  
149 OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, 2011 Edition, 17. Note: Unless specifically otherwise noted, 
the following remarks and page numbers refer to the revised 2011 version of the Guidelines.  
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position, as evidenced by the possibility to initiate a dialogue and consensus-based 
conciliation procedure in which the dispute is seek to be solved. However, an imposition of 
sanctions through the NCP is not provided for in the Guidelines. 
The UN report on Norms on the Responsibilities of transnational corporations and other 
Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights highlights the Guidelines’ pivotal role by 
considering these to be part of the four main initiatives for the enforcement of an 
entrepreneurial responsible behaviour.150 In literature, the Guidelines have moreover found 
a far reaching approval. The following circumstances are particularly seen to be causal for the 
enhanced importance of the Guidelines:  
1. The national governments are obliged to set up NPCs to support implementation. 
2. The stipulation of a transparent complaint- and inspection procedure. Albeit being of 
non-binding nature, the Guidelines at least provide for a mediation mechanism.  
3. Global nature (42 signatory states). Among the world's 193 (currently recognized by 
the UN) states the signatory states are responsible for by far most of the 2000 largest 
transnational corporations, and for up to 85% of the global investment.151 152 The 
signatory states are thus ‘origin of the largest part of global direct investment flows’ 
and cover a large part of the headquarters of most multinational companies.153 
6.2.2 REASONS FOR THE REVISIONS IN 2000 AND 2011 
The original version of the Guidelines (1976) differed from the revised versions both in terms 
of its content and its scope in as far as it has been geographically limited to the territories of 
the OECD member states. The original version already provided for National Contact Points 
and a complaint process, but the latter unfolded little practical effect. This has resulted in 
                                                     
150 Commentary, op cit 10.  
151  For more information see Global 2000 Leading Companies available at 
http://www.forbes.com/global2000/list, accessed on 21 November 2013.   




56988011,d.d2k&cad=rja, accessed on 21 November 2013.  
153 German version of the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, 2000 Edition, 5. 
Non-Binding Principle Based Frameworks 
- 72 - 
unions – hitherto the main complainants – becoming increasingly passive and moreover 
increasingly skeptical about the results of the conciliation procedures. Before the major 
revision in 2000, TUAC 154  General Secretary Evans stated: ‘But the Guidelines must be 
effectively implemented. If they are not, it will just lead to cynicism. That has been the 
situation for the last ten years – “voluntary” has come to mean “optional”, there have been 
“Kafkaesque” clarifications from the OECD CIME, and so many National Contact Points have 
been non-existent.’155 
This assessment seems to be supported and reflected in the number of filed complaints: 
Whereas until the mid-1980s 29 cases were brought forward, only six complaints were lodged 
until 2000. Furthermore, only half of the totally 35 complaints have resulted in a formal 
clarification by the CIME, and even these decisions lacked a measurable effect.156 
Having regard to the insufficient efficacy of the complaints procedure and the Guidelines as 
such, reference was made to the vague wording and the limited scope: ‘However, this 
document only affects OECD countries, most of which already have strong trade union 
movements and relatively consistent enforcement of labour laws.’157 In other words, because 
of the geographical limitations on territories of the participating states the vast majority of 
problem cases pertaining to business activities of multinationals were in fact not governed by 
the Guidelines. Hence, the objective to establish principles promoting responsible business 
practices in the entire world failed. Retrospectively it can be said that the original version of 
the Guidelines (1976) proved to be rather ineffective.  
                                                     
154 TUAC is the OECD’s Trade Union Advisory Committee.  
155 John Evans ‘The OECD Ministerial Council Conference on the Adoption of OECD-Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises’ available at http://old.tuac.org/statemen/communiq/guidel2000.htm, accessed on 21 November 
2013. The CIME was the Committee on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises, a panel of the 
OECD inter alia being responsible for the application and interpretation of the Guidelines. In 2004, the CIME 
merged into the Investment Committee.  
156 Source: Blanpain Roger & Colucci Michele op cit note 146 at 65 and 67 et seq. 
157  Harvey Pharis ‘Developing effective mechanisms for implementing labor rights in the global economy’ 




w&bvm=bv.56988011,d.d2k&cad=rja, accessed on 21 November 2013.  
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6.2.3 THE REVISED GUIDELINES 
The revised OECD Guidelines still provide non-binding recommendations on transnational 
corporations to the governments of the member states and can be divided into three parts: 
Part 1 includes, in addition to a general introduction, the actual principles, which are organised 
in eleven thematic sections. The second part includes instructions for the implementation and 
the grievance procedures, while the third part includes both explanations of the principles as 
well as comments on the implementation and complaint procedures. The following section is 
devoted to a brief introduction and examination of the Guidelines. 
In its introduction, the first part includes notes and draws attention to the important role 
multinationals play in the context of globalisation and the privatisation of the international 
stage. The profound structural transformations of the global economy are described as an 
opportunity to globally foster the development, but at the same time it is being pointed at the 
dangers involved.  
The introduction is followed by the principles, which are divided into eleven sections (I - XI), 
covering the following topics: 
I. Concepts and Principles 
Emphasizes the voluntary legal status of the principles and the goal of spreading 
"standards of good practice". Also of importance is the geographically extended 
ambit of the principles. 
 
II. General Policies 
Includes specific recommendations related to the relationship between 
multinationals, the public sector of the host countries as well as the other 
stakeholders. Multinationals are inter alia required to 
- comply with the principle of sustainable development, and  
- respect the human rights and international obligations of the host State.  
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A new feature of the Guidelines introduced with the revision in the year 2000 
concerns the general involvement of suppliers, subcontractors and joint-venture 
partners.158 The multinationals’ duty of care is extended to these exponents.  
III. Disclosure 
The entrepreneurial activities should be transparent not only in financial terms but 
also in terms of social, ethical and environmental issues. 
 
IV. Human Rights 
The Guidelines emphasize the duty of the states to protect human rights and 
multinationals are hold to recognise and respect human rights, thereby drawing 
‘upon the United Nations Framework for Business and Human Rights Protect, 
Respect and Remedy’.159 
 
V. Employment and Industrial Relations 
Particularly refers to the relationship between employers and employees and in 
essence contains the basic labour principles of the International Labour 
Organisation (ILO).   
 
VI. Environment 
Multinationals are encouraged and required to pursue a sustainable environment 
policy.  
 
VII. Combating Bribery, Bribe Solicitation and Extortion 





                                                     
158 OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, 2011 Edition, 20 et seq. 
159 Ibid at 31.  
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VIII. Consumer Interests 
Requires from multinationals the application of fair business, marketing and 
advertising practices. 
 
IX. Science and Technology 
This section calls for multinationals to contribute to the technological 
advancement of the host country through a technology and a know-how transfer. 
 
X. Competition 
In consideration of the detrimental effects of agreements among competitors on 
the free market, the Guidelines condemn anti-competitive arrangements.  
 
XI. Taxation 
Multinationals are held to comply with local tax regulations and to cooperate with 
national tax authorities in order to enable the determination of tax liabilities. 
Besides the inclusion of suppliers and subcontractors, the major innovation of the revision in 
the year 2000 is the territorial extension of the scope of the Guidelines. Whilst the old version 
(1976) was limited to the territories of the OECD member countries, the revised Guidelines 
also apply in those non-member states which have either (i) ratified the OECD Guidelines or 
are (ii) a host country of multinationals: ‘The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises 
are recommendations addressed by governments to multinational enterprises operating in or 
from adhering countries.’160 Since most of the largest multinationals have their headquarters 
in an OECD member state, the principles indeed guide and influence a vast majority of todays’ 
multinationals. 
The integration of a chapter on human rights based on a collaboration with the United Nations 
Special Representative for business and cooperation, John Ruggie, is the most important 
renewal of the revision efforts of 2011.161 
                                                     
160 Ibid at 3. 
161 For more information on the Ruggie Principles, see footnote 114. 
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6.2.4 NATIONAL CONTACT POINTS 
6.2.4.1 GENERAL REMARKS 
A peculiarity of the Guidelines which proves to be quite effective is the unique implementation 
mechanism supporting the Guidelines. Participating states are obliged to establish a National 
Contact Point (NCP).162 ‘The NCPs assist enterprises and their stakeholders to take appropriate 
measures to further the implementation of the Guidelines. They also provide a mediation and 
conciliation platform for resolving practical issues that may arise.’163 
An interested party alleging a breach or violation of the Guidelines can submit a complaint to 
the competent NCP.164 Upon such a complaint, the NCP will assess ‘whether the issues raised 
merit further examination and respond to the parties involved.’165 Should this be the case, the 
NCP will ‘offer good offices to help the parties involved to resolve the issues.’166 ‘Good office’ 
includes inter alia, subject to the consent of the involved parties, ‘access to consensual and 
non-adversial means, such as conciliation or mediation, to assist the parties in dealing with 
the issues.’167 
Since the revision of the Guidelines in the year 2000, the home NCP is deemed to be 
competent for issues arisen in a non-adhering country. In such a case, the home NCP shall 
pursue enquiries by corresponding with embassies and government officials of the country in 
question.  
The revised Guidelines moreover require the NCP upon conclusion of the procedure – thereby 
further contributing to an enhanced efficiency – to either publish: 
a) A statement should the NCP’s assessment lead to the verdict that the issues raised  
‘do not merit further considerations.’168 
                                                     
162 In this respect, the Guidelines are not voluntary but mandatory.  
163 OECD Guidelines op cit note 158 at 3.  
164 The term “interested parties” is not defined, but NGOs are subsumed under this terminology (page 79 of the 
OECD Guidelines).  
165 OECD Guidelines op cit note 158 at 72.  
166 Ibid at 72. 
167 Ibid at 73.  
168 Ibid at 73.  
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b) A report in case that the provision of good office has led to an agreement between 
the involved parties. Information revealing the content of the agreement however 
requires the approval of the involved parties.  
c) A statement should no agreement be reached or in case of unwillingness of a party 
to participate in any procedures at all. Should the NCP deem it appropriate, it may 
include the reasons for the failure to reach an agreement in its statement.  
In the light of the above, the strategy pursued by the Guidelines could, maybe best, be 
described as a “name and shame” concept. Considering the multinationals awareness of the 
detrimental reputational effect, public ‘naming and shaming’ obviously has to be considered 
an effective, general preventive “weapon”, contributing to and fostering an improved 
corporate behaviour. No multinational accused of unethical behaviour will be keen to read in 
a public statement issued by a governmental authority that it has been considered to be 
unwilling to participate in finding a solution to the raised issue.   
Therefore, the Guidelines embodying ethical principles do in fact – in “cooperation and 
interaction” with the various constituencies of civil society such as medias and NGOs – provide 
a promising and remarkably efficient tool to ensure and foster sound corporate behaviour, 
despite their non-binding status.  
6.2.4.2 MOPANI COPPER MINES PLC, ZAMBIA 
In the alleged tax evasion referred to in subchapter 3.1.5.1 complaints to the NCPs of Canada 
and Switzerland have been submitted in April 2011, inducing the procedures outlined above 
and resulting in numerous statements.  
On the basis of a leaked draft report by the audit firm Grant Thornton, 
Glencore International AG (now Glencore Xstrata) as the majority owner and the Canadian 
company First Quantum Ltd as well as a Zambian company belonging to the Zambian 
Government as the minority owners of Mopani Copper Mines plc were accused by a coalition 
of five NGOs of having violated Chapter II (General Policies) and Chapter XI (Taxation) of the 
Guidelines. The Swiss NCP’s procedure and reaction was as follows:  
1. The NCP initially separately invited representatives of the parties to explain its function 
and to enable first informal talks. 
Non-Binding Principle Based Frameworks 
- 78 - 
2. It convoked an ad-hoc group consisting of members of the Federal Department of 
Foreign Affairs and the Federal Department of Finance.  
3. The Swiss NCP and the Canadian NCP hold meetings to discuss, approve and coordinate 
their procedures.  
4. On 5 October 2011, the Swiss NCP concluded that the issues raised do merit further 
considerations and offered its good offices to promote a constructive dialogue 
between the parties.  
5. Upon the signalled willingness of all involved parties to participate in a dialogue, the 
NCP drafted the Terms of Reference and appointed and contracted a professional 
external mediator. 
6. The NCP provided for adequate facilities for the meeting held on 11 July 2011 and 
assisted the external mediator. 
7. The NCP issued various reports and statements.  
On 28 November 2012, the NCP released its final statement. Due to parallel and confidential 
non-judicial proceedings undertaken by Zambian tax authorities, the parties agreed to only 
partially disclose their mutual agreement:  
‘• The parties reached a certain level of mutual understanding on the issues raised and clarification of 
issues raised. 
• The parties had a thorough exchange of information and open and very constructive discussions. 
• Both sides agreed to an exchange of information with the other parties, within the limits of applicable 
laws. 
• Both parties will explore ways how to engage in further dialogue. 
• The parties discussed and agreed on certain further steps.’169 
 
Despite the status as “soft law” and thus the lack of “sharp teeth”, the Guidelines with its 
unique implementation mechanism are quite likely to affect the operations of multinational 
enterprises, as the example above illustrates. Hence, OECD’s hope that its set of ethical 
principles will prevail as a worldwide standard creating an international level playing field for 
multinationals, seems to be justified. 
                                                     
169 Final Statement by the Swiss NCP ‘Specific Instance regarding taxation policy by Mopani Copper Mines plc and 
Glencore International AG and First Quantum Minerals Ltd. in Zambia’ 5.  
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An example of this is the “Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and 
Other Forms of Wealth” (Panel), established in 2000 by the UN secretary-general at the behest 
of the Security Council to investigate and report on (corporate) misconduct in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo. They established that companies domiciled in non-adhering countries such 
as (inter alia) South Africa also violated the Guidelines, the Panel applied the latter as a global 
standard. 170  Because of the “naming-and-shaming-effect” elaborated above, the Panel’s 
naming of 85 companies allegedly having violated the Guidelines prompted strong reactions 
by the latter.  
6.2.5 INTERIM CONCLUSION 
Principles are pervasive in nature and have an intrinsic and an extrinsic effect: Intrinsically, 
principles provide behavioural guidelines to the various individuals involved in a corporate 
entity. While the original principles will be of concern to the company’s management, the 
employees, suppliers and customers etc. will more likely be affected and guided by the 
company’s Code of Conduct which inter alia serves as a transmitter of the original principles.171 
Extrinsically, principles as determined standards of conduct agreed upon on a broad basis 
create and express civil society’s expectations and therefore allows the “fourth power” 
(media) and NGO’s to assess the company’s degree of compliance with the principles and 
reveal and blame non-compliance.172 It goes without saying that civil society (and the media 
and the NGO’s in particular) greatly depend on transparency – as provided for by OECD’s 
                                                     
170 UN Panel of Experts, Final Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and 
Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 2002, 70. 
171 A Code of Conduct is basically a broadly communicated guideline promulgating the company’s values, policies 
and principles and moreover expressing the expected behaviour. According to UNCTAD’s World Investment 
Report 2012 (p. 93), 90 per cent of the multinationals have CSR-codices, most of them based on multilateral 
reference standards of organisations such as the OECD, UNO or ILO.      
172 There is a growing awareness of the nexus between corporate behaviour, the perception of the company in 
public, its reputation, the company’s goodwill and the impact on the bottom line (profit). Media and NGO’s fulfil 
a pivotal role as guardians of ethical principles. Their reports on corporate misconduct can directly affect the 
share value of a company. This also explains why Ivan Glasenberg in the light of numerous votes in the various 
municipalities (see footnote 74) and the therewith related (negative) publicity beyond the Swiss borders, (many 
renowned newspapers all over Europe carefully monitor what is happening and how the municipalities are 
voting), has broken the silence by sending a letter to the involved communities, emphasizing that the corporate 
misbehaviour alleged by NGO’s is without foundation and by furthermore referring to the various internal and 
external ethical guidelines that Glencore Xstrata adheres to. The letter is seen as expression of serious concerns 
about Glencore Xstrata’s reputation and its (new) willingness to be more responsive to civil society’s reservations 
about its business practices.     
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unique implementation mechanism entailing the disclosure of statements or reports – in order 
to fulfil their decisive function. The reporting concept contrived by the King Committee 
(integrated reporting) propels reporting standards to a new level, enabling the interested 
parties to assess a company’s performance in a hitherto unseen holistic way. It therefore does 
not come as a surprise that on an international level there are endeavours to globally promote 
this new reporting concept.173 Other more sophisticated and / or advanced reporting concepts 
than the currently prevalent one such as Global Reporting Initiative’s sustainability reports174 
or the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative’s (EITI) standards175  are already being 
implemented by many multinationals, inter alia Glencore Xstrata.176 They contribute to an 
enhanced transparency and an increased awareness of the relevancy of the triple bottom line.   
At the same time, principles have the advantage of being adaptable and more flexible, 
meaning that one size does not have to fit all.  
                                                     
173 The International Integrated Reporting Council (IIRC) is chaired by Prof. Mervyn E. King. ‘The mission of the 
IIRC is to create the globally accepted International <IR> Framework that elicits from organizations material 
information about their strategy, governance, performance and prospects in a clear, concise and comparable 
format. The Framework will underpin and accelerate the evolution of corporate reporting, reflecting 
developments in financial, governance, management commentary and sustainability reporting. The IIRC will seek 
to secure the adoption of <IR> by report preparers and gain the recognition of standard setters and investors. 
Our vision is for <IR> to be accepted globally as the corporate reporting norm, benefiting organizations, their 
investors and other stakeholders by enabling informed decision-making that leads to efficient capital allocation 
and the creation and preservation of value. By encouraging a different way of thinking, <IR> will contribute 
towards the advancement of a more sustainable global economy.’ IR ‘The IIRC’ available at 
http://www.theiirc.org/the-iirc/, accessed on 3 December 2013. 
174 ‘A sustainable global economy should combine long term profitability with ethical behavior, social justice, and 
environmental care. This means that when companies and organizations consider sustainability – and integrate 
it into how they operate – they must consider four key areas of their performance and impacts: economic, 
environmental, social and governance. GRI’s Sustainability Reporting Framework is a reporting system that 
enables all companies and organizations to measure, understand and communicate this information. GRI's 
mission is to make sustainability reporting standard practice; one which helps to promote and manage change 
towards a sustainable global economy.’ GRI ‘A Sustainable Global Economy’ available at 
https://www.globalreporting.org/information/about-gri/Pages/default.aspx, accessed on 3 December 2013. 
175 ‘The EITI maintains the EITI Standard. Countries implement the EITI Standard to ensure full disclosure of taxes 
and other payments made by oil, gas and mining companies to governments. These payments are disclosed in 
an annual EITI Report (to see all EITI Reports, go to data.eiti.org). This report allows citizens to see for themselves 
how much their government is receiving from their country’s natural resources. Transparency can only lead to 
accountability if there is understanding of what the figures mean and public debate about how the country’s 
resource wealth should be managed. Therefore, the EITI Standard requires that EITI Reports are comprehensible, 
actively promoted and contribute to public debate.’ EITI ‘The EITI Standard’ available at http://eiti.org/eiti, 
accessed on 3 December 2013. 
176 Xstrata has published sustainability reports in line with GRI’s guidelines since 2003, Glencore since 2011. 
Moreover, Glencore Xstrata is a supporter of the EITI Standards.  
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In the light of the above, the author has come to the conclusion that ethical based (ideally 
multilateral) principles have to be considered as a promising, effective and pragmatic measure 
to intrinsically and extrinsically affect the multinational’s behaviour beyond national 
boundaries, thereby moreover maintaining the fundamentally important principle of 
proportionality.  
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7 SWITZERLAND: PUBLIC AND POLITICAL DEBATES 
‘What is good for Marc Rich, is also good for Zug’ 
Walther Hegglin, member of the City Council of Zug, in the 1980s 
Being responsible for approximately one-third of the world trade, up to 28 per cent of the 
human rights violations and a fair amount of the reported environmental damages in an 
international context 177  and after a ten-fold increase over the past decade of the sales 
revenues (CHF 763 billion) and the net receipts (CHF 20 billion) resulting in a GDP share of 
3.4 per cent, a substantial (although not yet determined), share of the tax revenues, and 
approximately 10 000 jobs on a national (Swiss) level,178 it does not come as a surprise that 
the commodities sector has increasingly entered public and political awareness particularly 
over the past three years in Switzerland. Especially the numerous NGO’s studies, initiatives 
and reports having globalisation and its negative (and to a limited extent its positive) effects 
as their subject contributed to an increased sensibility of the broad public. 
7.1 NGOS AND COALITIONS 
The Berne Declaration for example, a Swiss NGO ‘promoting more equitable, sustainable and 
democratic North-South relations since 1968’179 and engaging itself for a fairer globalisation, 
has published a 384 page book in 2012 with the title Commodities – Switzerland’s most 
dangerous business.180 In its conclusion, the NGO demands that companies should conduct 
their business in an ethically responsible manner, thereby striving to meet the higher 
international (instead of the host country’s lower) standards. From Switzerland as the home 
                                                     
177 Figures according to United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and the UN Human 
Rights Council. 
178 Background Report op cit note 68 at 7 et seq.  
179 http://www.evb.ch/en.  
180 A free copy of this thoroughly elaborated book making astonishing revelations can be downloaded for free at 
http://www.evb.ch/en/p19492.html.  
Switzerland: Public and Political Debates 
- 83 - 
country of many multinationals, the NGO demands (i) a strategy ensuring that multinationals 
accept their responsibility (de facto a statutory regulation), (ii) the piercing of the corporate 
veil in order to enable foreign direct liability, (iii) the abolishment of the cantonal tax privileges 
mentioned in footnote 51 and (iv) generally more transparency (country-by-country 
report).181 
Moreover, 50 Swiss organisations have joined forces and gathered 135 285 signatures of Swiss 
citizens, urging the Federal Council and the Parliament to enact binding legal provisions 
compelling multinationals headquartered in Switzerland to comply with human rights and 
environmental standards worldwide. The coalition named Corporate Justice has launched a 
campaign and submitted petition no. 12.2042 to the Parliament in June 2012:  
‘With the petition, the Federal Council and the Parliament are invited to ensure that 
companies based in Switzerland must respect human rights and the environment worldwide. 
A legal basis is needed,  
– compelling Swiss companies to take precautionary measures (duty of care) pertaining to 
their own activities, the activities of their subsidiaries and the suppliers, in order to prevent 
human rights violations and environmental transgressions,  
– ensuring that people who suffered damages from the activities of Swiss corporations, their 
subsidiaries or suppliers, can file a claim and seek redress here.’182 
The Parliamentary deliberations on the petition are currently in progress. However, the 
coalition has increased the pressure on the Parliament on 5 November 2013 by announcing 
that the coalition is contemplating about a citizen’s initiative, should the Parliament’s 
                                                     
181 The NGO demands the enactment of similar disclosure regulations as provided for in the Dodd-Frank Act (US) 
or the EU Directives. Listed (US and EU) and non-listed (EU) companies in the commodities industry have to 
disclose any payments such as taxes, royalties and production entitlements etc. directly or indirectly made by 
them, their subsidiaries or entities under their control etc. to foreign governments.   
182 Petition no. 12.2042 available at 
 http://www.parlament.ch/afs/data/d/bericht/2012/d_bericht_s_k17_0_20122042_0_20130514.htm, accessed 
on 5 December 2013. A petition is a non-binding political tool to induce a legislatory process. Every Swiss citizen 
is entitled to submit a petition to any authority.  
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deliberations not lead to a satisfactory result.183 It remains to be seen if the installation of the 
sword of Damocles yields the desired effect.   
7.2 ACTIVITIES ON A POLITICAL LEVEL 
7.2.1 PARLIAMENTARY REQUESTS 
The increased awareness and sensitivity of the positive and negative impacts of the 
commodity industry is also reflected in the media and in an increasing number of 
parliamentary requests revolving around the commodities industry and its regulation. 
Whereas eight such requests have been submitted between 2002 and 2010, this amount has 
sharply risen (30!) in 2011 and 2012, as the overview (2002–2012) in addendum 9.6 shows.184 
From 1 January 2013 until 4 December 2013, another fourteen parliamentary requests have 
been submitted.  
7.2.2 INTERDEPARTMENTAL PLATFORM ON COMMODITIES: BACKGROUND REPORT 
In the light of the above, the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (FDFA), the Federal 
Department of Finance (FDF) and the Federal Department of Economic Affairs, Education and 
Research (EAER) have created an interdepartmental platform on commodities with the aim to 
analyse the legal (regulatory issues, tax situation, corporate and government responsibility) 
and economic situation, to elicit the various challenges such as reputational risks and foreign- 
and development policy considerations, and to formulate recommendations addressed to the 
Federal Council, the country’s executive consisting of seven members and serving as collective 
head of state.  
The mere fact that an interdepartmental platform has been set up and after months of 
researches and analysis a report has been elaborated reflects that such an undifferentiated 
                                                     
183 Switzerland is a direct democracy. Besides a referendum, Swiss citizens may since 1891 make use of another 
political instrument (citizen’s initiative) allowing them to amend or change the constitution, thereby forcing the 
Parliament to enact an implementing act. If 100 000 signatures of Swiss citizens supporting the initiative are 
collected within eighteen months, the initiative will be put to vote by the Swiss population. The initiative has 
proven to be a powerful tool to force the Parliament and the Government to get active in fields the political elite 
would prefer to remain passive. It moreover serves as impetus for broad political and public debates.    
184 Background Report op cit note 68 at 49 et seq.  
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and uncritical approach to the needs and desires of the extractive industry as expressed in the 
quotation at the beginning of this chapter is no longer conceivable today. 
In essence, the eagerly awaited Background Report (i) acknowledges and emphasizes the 
outstanding economic importance of the commodities industry for Switzerland and the pivotal 
role it moreover plays in world trade; (ii) draws attention to the challenges such as the growing 
international competition in terms of business location, reputational dangers for Switzerland 
caused by corporate misconduct and the impact on foreign- and development policies; (iii) it 
discusses regulatory-, oversight- and taxation issues such as the regulatory problems caused 
by the intertwinement of commodity trading and the provision of financial services and 
addresses the issue of corporate taxation and transfer pricing and it; (iv) presents the 
strengthening and promotion of corporate responsibility on a domestic and global level and 
capacity building in countries with a weak governance as the preferred strategy to be pursued.  
The Report has inter alia and in particular presented the following recommendations 




                                                     
185 Background Report op cit note 68 at 43 et seq. 
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The selection of recommendations presented above reflects and reveals the government’s 
strategy:  
- No sector specific legislation and no unilateral legislative approach;  
- Instead: Redress negative impacts by strengthening and promoting Corporate Social 
Responsibility, thereby involving international bodies (multilateral and principle based 
approach). Moreover, another focus lies on capacity building in the host countries (in 
terms of their weak governance); 
- Furthermore: Ensure and ameliorate transparency. 
The report and its strategic approach has been broadly welcomed, in particular by 
representatives of the commodities industry and representatives of economy in general. The 
report seems to reflect the current political consensus. The network Corporate Justice 
referred to above consisting of 50 organisations however attests the government a lack of 
vision. ‘It would be wrong to level a blanket of accusation at Switzerland claiming lack of 
commitment. The country has strongly supported the work of the UN Special Representative, 
both financially and in terms of personnel. It participates actively in several international 
initiatives designed to foster corporate social responsibility, especially with regard to 
commodities. Some examples are the UN Global Compact, the Extractive Industries 
Transparency Initiative (EITI) or the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights in the 
commodities and energy sector. The problem is that all these initiatives are voluntary and 
legally non-binding. They are not sufficient to effectively prevent human rights violations or 
environmental degradation by companies. They do not enable victims to get access to 
remedy.’186 In the eyes of Corporate Justice, self-regulation is not enough and therefore not a 
feasible approach.  
                                                     
186  Corporate Justice ‘Voluntary rules as sacrosanct‘ available at 
http://www.corporatejustice.ch/en/campaign/swiss-backgrounds/, accessed on 10 December 2013.  
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However, the report does not mark the final result – it is just the beginning of a more thorough 
political and social debate.  
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8 FINAL CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
‘It is the absence of broad-based business activity, not its presence, that  
condemns much of humanity  
to suffering.’  
Kofi Annan, former UN Secretary-General, 2005187 
8.1 FINAL CONCLUSIONS 
Globalisation 2.0 has enabled multinationals – through their transnational activities – to get 
rid of the shackles of national responsibility and to gain enormous economic, social and 
political weight and power as a consequence. This is particularly true for one of the alleged 
globalisation winners, the commodities sector. The world's population unsaturated and 
unbroken greed for raw material is used by multinationals as a hostage and has at least 
partially contributed to degenerate many national governments into their willing serving 
puppets. 
Since the international community of states has at the same time failed to create 
supranational institutions, (and still seems to be unwilling or incapable to do so), equipped 
with the necessary instruments and powers to meet the winners of globalisation at eye level 
and to impose binding rules on the latter, the multinationals have increasingly operated in a 
certain regulatory and thus control and power vacuum. Legislative unilateralism on the 
premise of preventive and repressive laws with extra-territorial effect arguably have limited 
effect (not least for reasons of practicality) and are, moreover, controversially debated and 
vastly disapproved, for both domestic and foreign policy reasons. This finding also has its 
validity with regard to the concept of foreign direct liability, as evidenced by a restrictive 
interpretation of the scope of the (former) star and bearer of hope under the tort laws, the 
                                                     
187  UN Secretary-General ‘Latest Statements‘ available at  http://www.un.org/sg/statements/?nid=1508, 
accessed on 16 December 2013.  
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U.S. Alien Tort Statute. The U.S. Supreme Court on 17 April 2013 has irrevocably denied an 
applicability of the ATS to human rights violations committed by corporations abroad.  
However, this does not spell a definite end to the enforcement of sound corporate behaviour 
based on tort law. What remains is the onerous and gruelling attempt to enforce sound 
corporate conduct based on the general principles of the western hemisphere’s tort laws. 
As a result of an increased sensitivity, the missing supranational bodies have been at least 
partially substituted by the admonishing conscience of the civil society, often represented by 
NGOs and the media. This conscience is increasingly anchored in unilateral as well as 
multilateral, principle-based, ethical and non-binding guidelines. 
These principles – ideally devised and enacted on a supranational level – are an expression of 
a mild, proportionate and pragmatic regulatory approach and develop – by encouraging 
leaders to pursue ethically desirable behaviour and thus reinforcing the positive aspects of 
globalisation – not only an intrinsic effect, but moreover – in as far as the principles are being 
understood as an expression of minimal expectations – an extrinsic effect enabling controls 
and an assessment of the degree of compliance. 
The “naming and shaming” concept has proved to be an effective weapon, thereby causing 
civil society to condemn any form of misconduct and directly impacting the reputation and 
thus the value (bottom line) of multinationals. However, transparency is decisive and essential 
for such a concept in order to enable it to fulfil its intended role. 
Due to a lack of a prospect of consensus on a supranational level it is therefore appropriate to 
pursue the path embarked on by further strengthening corporate governance and an ethical 
behaviour by means of principles-based, unilateral and multilateral Guidelines. 
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8.2 RECOMMENDATIONS 
In the light of the above and based on the previous chapters, inspired by the findings obtained 
from an in-depth examination of the King Report III and the Code for Responsible Investing in 
South Africa (CRISA) as well as in consideration of Switzerland’s liberal legislation tradition, 
the following recommendations are being made by the author, to be understood as impulses 
for further thoughts and as a contribution to the intensively conducted political and social 
debates revolving around the extractive industry and its regulation. 
8.2.1 NATIONAL (SWISS) LEVEL 
1. Globalisation has led to the rise of multinationals across the various sectors. Hence the 
pursuance of a multi-sectoral regulatory approach instead of a sector-specific legislation 
does seem as the more appropriate way to diminish the negative impacts multinationals 
can have in terms of environmental, social and economic issues.  
 
2. Having the very limited global effect of a unilateral (binding) statutory regulation in mind 
and considering the massive detrimental impact of such a regulation on the country’s 
competitiveness and ultimately its economy, Switzerland should not depart from its liberal 
regulatory approach and should therefore not (unilaterally) enact any hard-laws having a 
negative impact on the overall conditions for companies. Efforts to pierce or lift the 
corporate veil in case of multinationals to hold the parent company liable for the conduct 
of their subsidiaries (see subchapter 5.3) are in principle justified and do in fact reflect an 
economic reality, but have to be set about on an international, multilateral level.188 As a 
general principle, Switzerland should seek to redress the negative impacts multinationals 
can have in international forums and not by solitary means.  
 
3. Switzerland should – having King Code III as a model in mind and based on a apply or 
explain approach – revise its technical-organisational (but non-aspirational) Swiss Code of 
                                                     
188 An interesting option to be pursued on a multilateral level and facilitating foreign direct liability would be the 
introduction of a rebuttable presumption to the disadvantage of the parent company assuming that the parent 
company has been aware of the business conduct of its subsidiaries.    
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Best Practice for Corporate Governance (Swiss Code) and particularly 189  implement, 
promote and embody:  
(i) Instead of the current shareholder primacy model (or King Code’s stakeholder-
inclusive approach) the enlightened shareholder value approach.190 
(ii) Aspirational ethical values and concepts such as CSR and corporate citizenship, 
thereby intrinsically enhancing the awareness for ethically appropriate and 
desirable behaviour (ethical leadership) and extrinsically increasing the pressure to 
conduct business in an ethically correct manner. 
(iii) A provision stipulating that parent companies should – despite the legal, but as a 
reflection of the economic reality – assume full responsibility for the conduct of 
their subsidiaries.  
(iv) Ensure the utmost transparency. Transparency does – as a general rule – not 
restrict and limit a company in its business and wealth generation. It is a mild 
approach enabling civil society’s constituencies to assess a company’s behaviour 
and to fulfil its pivotal role referred to in the previous chapters. Therefore, the 
concept of integrated reporting should be introduced and compliance with the 
Swiss Code should become a listing requirement.191 
 
4. In derogation of the rather hesitant position taken by the interdepartmental platform in 
its recommendation 8, a more brisk approach to enact similar transparency provisions as 
those stipulated in the Frank-Dodd Act or the EU Directives is recommended. However, 
once more a global transparency standard should be elaborated and promoted.   
                                                     
189 Conceivably, sector specific principles could complement the generally applicable principles.    
190 In the eyes of the author, a business entity should in fact acknowledge and consider the pivotal importance 
of the shareholders as the providers of capital enabling its existence. Hence, a company’s main focus should be 
to act in the best interest of its shareholders, because this is what the concept of business entities has been set 
up for – as a vehicle to conduct business. Considering the interdependency and reciprocity between business 
entities and the (social, ecological and economical) environment they operate in it is, however, appropriate to 
pay attention to the interests of the other stakeholders, including (inter alia) the employees, the customers, the 
environment and the community the company operates in, since their interests have to be seen as critical for an 
effective risk management and moreover and in particular to enable the company the generation of a long-term 
shareholder-wealth.  
191 In compliance with the listing requirements of JSE, Glencore Xstrata will be obliged to devise an integrated 
report for the business year 2014. It will be interesting to observe the impact the integrated report and the 
concept behind it will have on the companies’ strategy.  
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5. In consideration of the pivotal role shareholders in general and institutional investors in 
particular play in the fragile check and balance system and in order to ensure a sustainable 
long-term strategy, the shareholders’ awareness of their responsibilities should be 
enhanced and the latter should be encouraged to become more active  equity holders. 
With the publication of the “Guidelines for Institutional Investors on the Exercise of their 
Participation Rights in Joint-Stock Companies” (an equivalent to CRISA) on 21 January 2013 
and elaborated by representatives of the economy, institutional investors and 
independent proxy representatives), a first step in the right direction has been made.192 
However, others are to be followed; one of them could be the stipulation of a loyalty bonus 
(special dividend) to be granted to shareholders having held the shares for a certain time 
period; another (rather non-liberal) possibility to be considered is the stipulation of a legal 
duty for pension and retirement funds to vote at general meetings and to do so in the 
interest of their policyholders. Moreover, theses institutional investors should be obliged 
to disclose how they have voted.    
8.2.2 INTERNATIONAL LEVEL 
Considering the transnational activities of multinationals, the international forum is the 
appropriate forum for most of the issues relating to the effects of globalisation. However, it is 
also a very lethargical, inefficient forum due to the lack of power. However, at least the 
adoption of reference guidelines (such as the OECD Guidelines) by the UN should be striven 
for. An adoption of guidelines by the UN would confer much more moral weight upon the 
principals embodied therein.  
  
                                                     
192 The Guidelines can be downloaded at 
http://www.economiesuisse.ch/de/SiteAssets/PDF%20Download%20Files/Forms/EditForm/Richtlinien_integral
_(16012013)_d.pdf.  
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8.3 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The – free of any aphorisms and thus rather modest – present contribution to the current 
national and global debate is an expression of the difficult political and social multi-
dimensional framework. In the absence of a supranational institution having the power to 
enact and impose binding rules and considering that a solo of individual states is neither 
recommended nor likely, the author calls for the pursuit of a policy of small steps based on 
(ideally multilateral) voluntary, ethical principles, for the power of pervasive ethical principles 
should not be underestimated. It is certainly not the fastest, but not necessarily a less 
successful way leading to a more responsible (corporate) world in which companies are held 
accountable for their conduct – either by judges, the broad society or ideally both.  
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9.6 PARLIAMENTARY REQUESTS  
 
 
 
